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Members of the Gaza Parkour Team jump off  a wall at the beach. 
Photo by Eoghan Rice / Trocaire from Ireland
Today, precariousness seems to be the leitmotiv of life for young people in the Middle East and 
North Africa. Th is precariousness is 
experienced diff erently depending on a 
young person’s social class, gender, place 
of residence, citizenship status, etc., but 
overall the current generation is faced 
with a much more diffi  cult transition 
into adult life than their predecessors due 
to a variety of factors: insecure and low 
quality jobs or unemployment, constrained 
mobility, delays and diffi  culties in forming 
a family, fi nding a house and becoming 
independent. Underwriting all of this is a 
general uncertainty about the future.
Th is special issue of Th e Middle East 
in London focusses on diff erent aspects 
of youth precariousness (or precarity) in 
MENA – from employment problems 
to migration to recent forms of youth 
activism – drawing from the results 
of a three-year-long research project, 
POWER2YOUTH, funded by the 
European Union’s Seventh Framework 
Program and coordinated by the Istituto 
Aff ari Internazionali (IAI) of Rome. Th e 
project, carried out by a consortium of 
some 12 EU and south-east Mediterranean 
academic institutions including SOAS, 
sought to off er a critical understanding 
of youth in the south-east Mediterranean 
region through a comprehensive 
interdisciplinary and multi-level approach. 
In Insight, we call for a political 
economy approach when dealing with 
youth and youth problems, whilst Myriam 
Catusse and Blandine Destremau analyse 
the varying defi nitions of ‘the Youth’ that 
actually seem to institute the youth across 
a series of divides (class, gender, etc.), 
thereby giving rise to a conception that 
favours governing parts of them deemed 
dangerous.
Linda Herrera (taking up the work 
of Guy Standing) argues that the youth 
of today are the new ‘Precariat’, and she 
criticises market-oriented policies that 
overstate the value of self-employment and 
entrepreneurship among the youth. Jon 
Pedersen and Åge A. Tiltnes present some 
of the results of the POWER2YOUTH 
youth-survey (carried out in Morocco, 
Tunisia, Egypt, the Occupied Palestinian 
Territories, Lebanon and Turkey) on 
issues of informality and precariousness. 
Françoise De Bel-Air looks at the 
securitisation of youth migration by 
the EU and Gulf countries. Mona Harb 
describes the situation of Lebanon’s youth: 
trapped in a political system sealed by 
hegemonic political-sectarian parties. 
Amid this bleak picture, she fi nds some 
tenuous hope in recent youth initiatives. 
Nadine Sika reports on a summary of 
her empirical research that shows general 
youth distrust in political institutions has 
developed into new and unconventional 
forms of political participation in the 
region. 
Finally, the issue concludes with Maria 
M. Mexi’s analysis of the youth struggle 
in Greece, part of POWER2YOUTH’s 
comparative eff ort that reaches outside 
of MENA, underlining the similarities of 
youth conditions and struggles in MENA 
and southern European countries.
Maria Cristina Paciello, Daniela Pioppi, Istituto Aff ari Internazionali (IAI)
Dear Reader
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INSIGHT
The current socio-economic and political crisis in the MENA region aff ects the whole of society with a 
greater burden on medium to lower social 
strata and other disadvantaged groups. 
But it is the youth of today who are caught 
in the eye of the storm; it is through the 
generation now entering the labour market 
that a number of ‘normative ideas about 
responsibilities and entitlements of the 
previous welfare and developmental state are 
being re-negotiated’ (Sukarieh and Tannock, 
Youth Rising?, 2015). Th e youth phase off ers 
a privileged vantage point from which to 
observe broader processes of social change 
and continuity. It is during this time – when 
young men and women begin to make 
their transitions into adult life – that we are 
more likely to see change and continuity 
in working conditions, family forms and 
patterns of social inequalities.
Important as it is today the focus on youth, 
prevailing approaches to youth and youth 
problems in the region are problematic in 
many respects, most of all because they fail 
to place changing youth conditions, and the 
narratives associated with the youth category 
itself, into existing power relations and 
political economy processes.
A political economy of youth 
Prevailing explanations of youth 
problems tend to emphasise the severity of 
demographic pressures (youth bulge) and 
a lack of adequate skills to meet market 
requirements (the so-called ‘education-
employment nexus’). In making youth 
employment problems purely a matter of 
individual characteristics and/or defi ciencies 
of the education system, such analyses 
completely hide the structural factors behind 
the spread of precariousness and insecurity 
among the youth. Our understanding of 
youth-related problems needs instead to 
be set within the context of the structural 
transformations induced by the local 
implementation of neoliberal globalisation in 
the last three decades. 
Neoliberal reforms have signifi cantly 
reconfi gured state-labour-capital relations 
in the MENA region in ways that have 
dramatically transformed the landscape 
of work. With the adoption of structural 
adjustment policies since the mid-1980s, 
incumbent regimes have abandoned 
the policy of off ering jobs to university 
graduates leading to an increase in youth 
unemployment. Labour laws were revised 
to deregulate the labour market by ensuring 
freedom of hiring and fi ring, restricting the 
right of strike and allowing the use of fi xed-
term contracts – which have become the 
most common type of contract among young 
people. Th e integration of the region into the 
international market, rather than creating 
quality job opportunities for educated 
young people, has been based on low-cost 
outsourcing in unskilled activities, oft en 
tapping into a reserve pool of young female 
labour. 
Moreover, neoliberal restructuring has 
also reinforced labour fragmentation due 
to its selective and uneven implementation 
across space and time. Th us, while living 
a precarious existence, youth are today 
increasingly divided and diff erentiated along 
national, racial and gender lines. Inequalities 
between cities and rural areas have 
increased since governments have generally 
prioritised urban centres to promote capital 
accumulation. 
Th e gradual dismantling of the welfare 
state has also further fragmented the 
experience of being young. Under the 
infl uence of international agencies such as 
the World Bank, reform of the educational 
system favoured the privatisation of 
universities which has augmented key 
structural inequalities. Public policies – such 
as the plethora of job creation programmes It is the youth of today who are caught in the eye of the storm
MENA youth and the need for 
a political economy approach
Maria Cristina Paciello and Daniela 
Pioppi stress the need to study youth in 
context to avoid analyses that are reductive 
or romanticised
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established in the 1990s-2010s – have 
exacerbated precariousness and reinforced 
fragmentation by specifi cally targeting a 
particular subset of youth.
In addition, while pressure on youth 
to migrate has deepened under the 
drive of neoliberal reforms and war, the 
securitisation of migration policies in the 
EU (particularly since 2000) has furthered 
employment precariousness and insecurity 
with the spread of temporary and seasonal 
labour migration programmes for low-
skilled workers. Yet, by excluding certain 
nationalities and prioritising specifi c groups 
of migrants (highly skilled workers and 
researchers), the securitisation of migration 
policies in the EU and the Gulf also 
appears to have reinforced labour market 
fragmentation among youth within MENA 
countries. Th e category of youth, therefore, 
hides a multiplicity of employment relations 
that are likely to produce very diff erent 
experiences of ‘being young’ and trajectories 
to adulthood.  
Youth as an actor of change?
Any major reconfi guration of state-labour-
capital relations has an impact on every 
aspect of socio-political life and on the forms 
and dynamics of political mobilisation that 
are shaped today by increased inequalities, 
social fragmentation and overwhelming 
state repression. Th e 2010-2011 wave of 
popular uprisings in the Arab region were 
largely interpreted as being ‘youth-led 
revolts’. All of a sudden, the global political 
discourse was full of references to ‘youth 
revolutionary potential’, ‘youth agency’ and 
‘youth transformative power’. Such a positive 
enthusiasm and emphasis on the youth’s 
political role – both by global actors and, 
sometimes, by the protestors themselves – 
should not go unnoticed; in fact, it is in need 
of a critical analysis. 
Th e idea of ‘youth’ as a coherent ‘political 
actor’ could be misleading in many respects. 
First of all, if taken as a whole, the current 
generation is facing a more diffi  cult 
transition to adulthood with respect to 
previous ones; but young people are of 
course as diverse as the entire society. Th e 
use of the youth category could thus have 
a depoliticising eff ect, hiding other – we 
would say more relevant and certainly more 
challenging – social divides, such as class. 
Also, the emphasis on youth has the eff ect of 
downplaying the role of adults and adult-led 
organisations and of interpreting current 
social confl icts as intergenerational, glossing 
over more signifi cant issues of political 
economy that concern the youth and the 
society at large.
Th e uncritical appraisal of the youth’s 
political role is also inextricably related 
to the liberal overemphasis of individual 
agency, thereby systematically downplaying 
the importance of well-structured mass 
organisations and underestimating the 
strength of power structures which, 
according to the narrative associated with 
youth, could be easily disrupted by the 
sudden mobilisation of atomised masses of 
(young) individuals. 
Furthermore, the use of the youth 
category conceals a marked preference 
for certain forms of mobilisation more 
compatible with liberal civic values than 
other, more disruptive and less palatable 
ones. So, for instance, ‘youth movements’ 
are generally identifi ed with the so-called 
‘new social movements’: loose networks of 
techno-savvy individuals, urban and middle 
class-based. Other forms of mobilisation, 
such as the variety of Islamist movements 
or labour-based mobilisations, are either 
not considered ‘youth movements’ or – in 
agreement with the binary approach oft en 
associated with youth – are considered to 
be an expression of the ‘bad’, ‘unsupervised’, 
‘ill-guided’ youth in need of control and 
repression. In order to understand recent 
waves of mobilisation in the region, to which 
young men and women are participating in 
various forms, we need to consider a much 
larger geography of protest, a geography 
in which ‘the youth’ appears to be more of 
a ‘constructed’ category (too broad and to 
narrow at the same time) than a political 
actor in itself. 
To sum up, any analysis of youth problems 
and of the forms and dynamics of youth 
political participation needs to be placed 
in a broader context, in contrast to narrow 
prevailing approaches that have so far 
stressed the ‘challenges of the youth bulge’ 
or, paradoxically, ‘the enormous potential 
of youth collective mobilisation’, while 
underestimating, and sometimes hiding, 
existing power relations and political 
economy processes.
Maria Cristina Paciello is Adjunct Professor 
in political economy of Islamic countries 
at the University of Venice Ca' Foscari and 
Senior Fellow at the Mediterranean and 
Middle East Programme of the Istituto Aff ari 
Internazionali (IAI). She is the Scientifi c 
Co-coordinator of the EU FP7 project 
POWER2YOUTH (www.power2youth.eu)
Daniela Pioppi is Associate Professor of 
contemporary history of Arab countries at 
the University of Naples ‘L’Orientale’ and 
Senior Fellow at the Mediterranean and 
Middle East Programme of the Istituto Aff ari 
Internazionali (IAI). She is the Scientifi c 
Co-coordinator of the EU FP7 project 
POWER2YOUTH (www.power2youth.eu)
Any analysis of youth problems and of the forms and dynamics of 
youth political participation needs to be placed in a broader context
Egypt
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YOUTH PRECARITY IN MENA
Who are the youth in Arab countries? What kind of specifi c problems are they dealing with? 
Can we tell them from their age, their looks, 
their presence in public spaces? Which 
public bodies and institutions care about 
them, and what for? 
A team of researchers working on six 
countries – Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco, 
Palestine, Lebanon and Turkey – examined 
these questions within the framework 
of the European-funded project 
POWER2YOUTH: Freedom, Dignity and 
Justice. We coordinated a body of research 
bearing on youth policies in four domains: 
employment, migration, family, and spatial 
planning, and the papers are available on 
the POWER2YOUTH website (Catusse and 
Destremau, Governing Youth, Managing 
Society, 2016). 
Aft er we noted the discrepancies in the 
defi nitions used by various institutions 
and organisations – from one country to 
another, between national institutions, as 
well as between national and international 
institutions, and depending on the issue at 
stake – we decided to tackle the questions 
‘Who are the Youth?’ and ‘What does it 
mean to be young today?’.
In this short paper, we would like to 
explain how the varying defi nitions of ‘the 
Youth’ targeted by public policies actually 
institute the youth across profound class, 
gender and territorial diff erentiations, and 
enable methods for governing the parts 
of them deemed ‘dangerous’ or ‘in need 
of control’. Even more: implementing 
‘Youth policies’ can be a way to neutralise 
intergenerational issues, to dissimulate the 
collective problems of ‘young people’, and 
to disguise other kinds of social, economic, 
political or cultural inequities. 
Th ere is no such thing as THE youth! 
Th e 2011 social upheavals experienced 
in the MENA region have commonly been 
associated with generational movements 
or explained by the ‘youth bulge’. MENA is 
the second youngest region in the world, 
aft er sub-Saharan Africa, but its countries 
display major disparities. Furthermore, all 
of these societies have experienced dramatic 
economic, social and anthropological 
transformations in recent decades. 
Today, legions of young men and women 
are entering the workforce at a time when 
opportunities are limited, unemployment 
is high and public policy is constrained, 
due to structural adjustments and the 
economic crisis. Compared with the 
previous generation, urbanisation rates 
and educational levels are historically high, 
marriage patterns have been disrupted and 
fertility rates are dropping. As Fargues’ early 
work has shown, the patriarchal system is 
shaken with the demographic transition, 
and with it inter-family relations and some 
political foundations (Générations arabes. 
L’Alchimie du nombre, 2000). More recently, 
too, Courbage and Todd in Le rendez vous 
des civilisations (2007) have argued against 
culturalist interpretations of the clash of 
civilisations, while others have concluded 
that the ‘youth’ of the region are the new 
‘dangerous classes of globalisation’. 
Our work shows how the category of 
‘youth’, far from stemming from nature and 
biology, is derived from the construction 
of a public issue haunted by implicit 
assumptions, marked by the 2011 uprisings 
and their wake and pegged to sectoral 
policies. ‘Youth’ appears as a euphemism, or 
a shielded category, for public action; there 
is no such thing as ‘the youth’.
Naming, categorising and governing
Regardless of its constitution, the image 
of the youth bulge remains useful for 
(Arab) Youth, 
a versatile 
government 
category?
Myriam Catusse and Blandine 
Destremau on how the various defi nitions 
of youth can be used to govern, delegitimise 
and dissumulate segmentations of young 
people and their problems
‘Youth’ appears as a euphemism, or a shielded category, 
for public action; there is no such thing as ‘the youth’
Headquarters of the Democratic Constitutional Rally, Sfax, Tunisia, 
August 2013
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Public policy generates, reproduces and legitimises 
inequalities between the various groups of youth
explaining youth problems. We contend it 
is considered negatively only because youth 
are conceived of as a burden and a problem, 
not a resource. 
Public policy discourses frame ‘youth’ in 
a particularly dualistic construction: on the 
one hand, as a political and security threat, 
a social and economic burden; on the other 
hand, as resources for the future, creativity 
and modernity. To a large extent, this strong 
cleavage refl ects (but dichotomises and 
simplifi es) real diff erences, inequalities and 
modes of integration, especially between 
social classes and places of residency. 
Beyond, public action elaborates various 
categories of persons, at which specifi c 
treatment will be directed. While the 
idealised portrait of well-bred, forward-
looking, proactive, consuming and investing 
young men is promoted and disseminated 
by national and international public 
policies alike, young women are supposed 
to navigate between, at best, professional 
achievement, and for most, tending to the 
family. Except in established frameworks, 
such as ‘unemployed graduates’, those who 
are incompatible with this happy picture 
are made inaudible and invisible through 
a range of political systems that include 
public discourses, statistics and policies of 
‘containment’ resembling the walls erected 
along the streets of the cities to hide the 
slums. 
If most young people are aff ected 
by one policy or another, according to 
their characteristics (gender, place of 
residence, education, standard of living, 
etc.), integration and framing schemes 
distribute them diff erentiated positions 
according to explicit or implicit processes 
of positive and negative selection. Hence, 
public policies are governing people’s (young 
and elder) behaviour, representations and 
interrelations, through the mobilisation of 
tools that refl ect and produce segmentation, 
intersections and fragmentations.
Th e fi rst level of control consists of 
a regulatory framework – particularly 
regarding the family, gender and sexual 
norms – which intersects the area of 
employment. Th e second level is the 
institutional framework where sports 
policies, ‘civil society’ and ‘development’ 
(euphemisms for a liberal vision of 
self-realisation), entrepreneurship and 
consumerism, occupy a prominent place. 
Finally, governing ‘youth’ implies police 
repression and militarised intervention: 
multiple initiatives and social movements 
are subdued by force; young artists, 
journalists, bloggers, or those claiming 
alternative forms of freedom, fi nd 
themselves exposed to outright violence 
from the authorities.
Hence, public action actually institutes 
categories framed by sub-narratives, as 
though they were real sociological groups. 
Public action is thus performative: by 
targeting them, it actually generates various 
types of youth, supposed to embody specifi c 
characteristics and to deserve various 
policies. In this perspective, public policy 
also generates, reproduces and legitimises 
inequalities between the various groups of 
youth. 
Institutional stickiness
Public policy perpetuates a tension 
between two approaches: that of ‘the 
problems of youth’ and that of ‘youth as a 
problem’. Urban youth, angry and frustrated 
by economic, political and social crises are 
viewed as threatening, potential criminals 
or terrorists. 
Regardless of warning signals, the six 
country studies – which survey a range of 
contexts including examples such as the 
regime change in Tunisia or the ephemeral 
experience of the Muslim Brotherhood 
government in Egypt – demonstrate 
that fi ve years aft er the fi rst uprisings, 
no major changes have come about in 
public action. Instead, they highlight 
forms of ‘institutional stickiness’, described 
by Crouch and Farrel in their 2004 
work ‘Breaking the Path of Institutional 
Development? Alternatives to the New 
Determinism (Rationality and Society, vol. 
16, no. 1, 2004), and a reinforcement of 
previous trends with fl agrant continuity 
aft er 2011. 
Performing actions that generate and 
manipulate the categories of ‘youth’ and 
‘generation’ seem to feed legitimacy for 
the policy-producing institutions and 
the policies themselves. Beyond, by 
muffl  ing some of the tensions arising from 
fragmented social landscapes riddled 
with inequality, frustration and potential 
social confl ict, they nurture a social, 
political and economic order that controls 
socio-economic mobility and protects 
the reproduction of power structures and 
relationships.
Myriam Catusse is a Political Scientist, 
Head of Contemporary Studies Department 
of Institut français du Proche-Orient 
(Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, Iraq, Palestinian 
territories). She has co-edited Jeunesses 
arabes. Du Maroc au Yémen: loisirs, cultures 
et politiques (La Découverte, 2013) and 
L’Etat face aux débordements du social au 
Maghreb (IREMAM/ Karthala, 2010)
Blandine Destremau is a Sociologist, Research 
Director at the Iris/EHESS (Paris). She has 
co-authored Women and Civil Society 
Capacity Building in Yemen: a Research 
Perspective on Development (CEFAS/
CNRS, Yemen, 2012). She has also edited 
L’Etat face aux débordements du social au 
Maghreb (IREMAM/Karthala, 2010)
Aram ash-Sharif 
(Esplanade of the 
Mosques), Jerusalem, 
November 2013© 
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YOUTH PRECARITY IN MENA
In 2011, the year millions of people poured onto streets across the Arab states demanding ‘bread, freedom 
and social justice’, the western media and 
scholarly community dramatically changed 
its discourse on youth in the Middle East 
and North Africa (MENA). Previously, 
it was common to read cautionary and 
alarmist descriptions of the frustrated 
‘generation in waiting’ (for jobs and 
opportunities), who were ‘at risk of Islamist 
extremism’ and in need of ‘democracy 
promotion’ programmes. Suddenly in 2011, 
young people were rebranded as ‘the non-
violent champions of democracy’ and the 
tech savvy and liberal ‘Facebook youth’. I 
would argue that all these characterisations 
of youth were ideologically driven. A more 
accurate – if decidedly less shrill – term to 
describe the collective class of youth in all 
their diversity would be ‘the Precariat’.  
Th e Precariat: Th e New Dangerous Class 
by Guy Standing hit the bookstands in 
2011 as the uprisings were unfolding. 
Standing, a labour economist and 
Professorial Research Associate at SOAS 
is not a specialist on the MENA region 
per se, yet the book describes the crisis 
of youth and the conditions of life and 
labour more lucidly and forcefully than 
the key policy literature on the region, a 
notable example being the Arab Human 
Development Report (AHDR) 2016: Youth 
and the Prospects for Human Development 
in a Changing Reality.
Th e AHDR report draws on a market-
based language of youth empowerment 
and life choices that date back to the 1990s. 
It essentially extracts notions of ‘power’ 
from the concept of ‘empowerment’. Th e 
term is imbued with individual self-
reliance, the assumption being that young 
people can take charge of their own lives 
and become eff ective agents of change, 
irrespective of structural impediments. 
Th e AHDR report downplays the 
potential collective power in ‘youth’ by 
employing the terms ‘youth’ and ‘young 
people’ interchangeably (p. 25). Th e report 
does not make a distinction between 
‘young person’, an individual of a particular 
age with no specifi c relation to history, and 
‘youth’ which signifi es a social collectivity 
similar to social class or ethnicity, and 
which occupies a distinct place in power 
structures and historical processes. Th is 
distorted framing of empowerment 
advances a development model in which 
young people are encouraged to break their 
collective bonds as ‘youth’ in exchange for 
facing the future as competing individuals.
Th e report stresses that policymakers 
and educators ‘should strive to achieve a 
good fi t between the output of educational 
institutions and the demands of the labour 
market’ by, among other things, promoting 
‘entrepreneurial and management capacity 
and the value of self-employment’ (p. 184).
We must ask, ‘What are the demands of 
the labour market to which schools and 
universities must answer?’ As Standing 
lays out in his 2016 book, Th e Corruption 
of Capitalism: Why Rentiers Th rive and 
Work Does Not Pay, the market favours 
Middle East 
youth as ‘the 
Precariat’?
The old ideas are not working. Linda 
Herrera describes how MENA can 
better serve its youth and pave the way to 
opportunity and security
In 2011, young people were rebranded as 
‘the non-violent champions of democracy’ and 
the tech savvy and liberal ‘Facebook youth’
Cover of the Arab Human Development Report 2016
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Evidence is mounting that youth entrepreneurship, 
while it clearly benefi ts a few in the short term, is 
more likely to lead the young into a debt trap
fl exible, short-term and cheap labour; it 
thrives on educated, unstable and energetic 
people who are willing to intern, volunteer, 
work long hours, undercut the value of 
their labour, work remotely, continuously 
retrain and not make demands for benefi ts, 
collective bargaining or job security. 
As the mainstream policy 
community focusses obsessively on 
educational outputs, testing and youth 
entrepreneurship, it misses the opportunity 
to retool education as a place to cultivate 
citizens, strengthen social solidarity, 
and provide a space for communities to 
imagine and experiment with solutions to 
the intractable challenges of our times. 
Entrepreneurship is not the solution
It is not clear what percentage of the 
one hundred million 15-29 year olds in 
the Arab World, a third of the population, 
is supposed to become self-employed 
entrepreneurs. Such a push is reminiscent 
of the late 1980s, when UN agencies, global 
fi nance institutions and non-governmental 
organisations joined forces on a massive 
scale to promote microfi nance to alleviate 
poverty. Aft er more than three decades of 
experimentation and data collection, the 
evidence overwhelmingly points to the fact 
that microfi nance does not cure poverty 
and has been called ‘a death trap’ and 
‘disaster’ for many. Small-scale, temporary 
income generation cannot be a substitute 
for stable work and social protection. 
Likewise, evidence is mounting that 
youth entrepreneurship, while it clearly 
benefi ts a few in the short term, is more 
likely to lead the young into a debt trap. We 
know from the student debt crisis in the 
United States and Britain that debt leads 
the young further into insecurity, feelings 
of hopelessness and precarity. 
Th e pages of the report are peppered 
with examples of success stories, the dream 
being that any Arab entrepreneur could 
be the next Steve Jobs. While youthful 
drive and ambition are positive qualities, 
it is unfair and disingenuous to propagate 
the myth that anyone with an idea, grit 
and determination can be a successful 
entrepreneur. 
Economist Mariana Mazzucato has 
written extensively on how companies in 
the ‘new economy’, such as Apple, Google 
and others, ‘that like to portray themselves 
as the heart of US entrepreneurship, have 
very successfully surfed the wave of US 
government-funded investments’. Th e 
Internet, GPS, touchscreen display and 
Siri are among the ‘startups’ that benefi tted 
from steep US government funding. If 
Arab governments and businesses are 
serious about youth entrepreneurship, 
they should provide resources and support 
organisations to guide and support young 
talent, not lead them down a road of 
borrowing and debilitating debt. 
What is a reasonable bargain for youth?
Today’s youth in the MENA region, 
to borrow Guy Standing’s words, ‘are 
not off ered a reasonable bargain’. If we 
listen to, respect and take seriously the 
voices of youth that rang out six years ago 
during the uprisings, we will hear that 
these old ideas are not working. If the 
international development community 
wants to sincerely work with youth and 
governments to advance security, dignity, 
livelihoods and democracy, it must 
exercise more self-refl ection and be willing 
to accept at least some responsibility for 
misguided policies that have contributed 
to the sorry state of aff airs. Standing posits 
that since youth ‘make up the core of 
the Precariat’ they are the ones who ‘will 
have to take the lead in forging a viable 
future for it’ (2011, p. 113). Let us, citizens, 
scholars and members of the policy 
community, commit to supporting youth 
in their collective struggles to reach a road 
to opportunity, security and dignity, rather 
than push them further along a perilous 
path of precarity. It is the only way.
A diff erent version of this piece was 
published on the website Mada Masr on 11 
February 2017 with the title ‘Th e precarity 
of youth: Entrepreneurship is not the 
solution’
Linda Herrera is a Professor in the 
Department of Education Policy, 
Organization & Leadership and Director 
of the Global Studies in Education program 
at the University of Illinois at Urbana-
Champaign. Her recent publications 
include On Silencing the Next Generation: 
Legacies of the 1974 Ethiopian Revolution 
on Youth Political Engagement, Arab 
Youth: Disruptive Generation of the 21st 
Century? (2015), Revolution in the Age of 
Social Media (2014) and Wired Citizenship 
(2014). She curates the website for global 
citizenship education, Democracy Dialogue 
(www.democracydialog.com)
President Obama, Facebook CEO Mark 
Zuckerberg and three entrepreneurs sit on a 
panel at the Global Entrepreneurship Summit 
held 22-24 June 2016 at Stanford University in 
California, USA. GES Photo
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YOUTH PRECARITY IN MENA
They want to leave. Th at is the stark reality of youth attitudes towards their situation in the six south-east 
Mediterranean countries covered by recent 
POWER2YOUTH surveys. Our research 
shows that in Tunisia as many as 34 per 
cent of youth respondents intend to move 
abroad to work or seek work in the coming 
fi ve years, and while other countries have 
lower percentages, those wanting to leave 
are still substantial: Morocco, 27 per cent; 
Palestine, 24 per cent; Lebanon, 22 per cent; 
Egypt, 14 percent and Turkey, 7 per cent. 
Th e fi gures are higher for men than women, 
refl ecting the much higher male labour force 
participation rate in this region.  
One reason for the desire to leave is high 
unemployment – young people cannot 
fi nd jobs, or jobs they consider satisfactory. 
Reported unemployment among youth 
ranges from 20 per cent in Lebanon to 
respectively 50 and 51 per cent in Palestine 
and Tunisia. Furthermore, a substantial 
number of young housewives and students 
not seeking work would have entered the 
labour market if they were off ered a part-
time or full-time job with a decent salary, 
suggesting that the ‘true’ unemployment rate 
is even higher. 
However, unemployment is a 
characteristic of those that have not found a 
job they deem suitable and who can aff ord to 
be without one because they enjoy some sort 
of safety net: savings, support from family or 
other sources. Th ose who cannot aff ord to 
be without a job must work, and may accept 
conditions they would rather avoid.
Th e new precariousness
Th e labour market of the high-income 
welfare societies of Europe is changing. 
For many years, the rule was traditional, 
relatively safe, full-time jobs with 
entitlements to social security within the 
formal sector. However, precariousness 
in the form of temporary jobs is on the 
rise. In contrast, low-income societies are 
characterised by labour markets with a high 
degree of informality: jobs without formal 
contracts, outside of licensing and taxation, 
unprotected by legal frameworks, and 
without welfare benefi ts. 
Middle-income countries like those in 
the south-eastern Mediterranean share both 
characteristics. Informality remains and is 
sometimes on the rise, such as in Palestine, 
whilst modern forms of precariousness are 
being introduced in the labour markets. 
Th us, young people are faced with a double 
bind: the traditional informality and the new 
precariousness.
Youth in the southern and 
eastern Mediterranean: 
between informality and precariousness
Unemployment, job insecurity and a lack 
of trust in institutions plague MENA’s 
youth. Jon Pedersen and Åge A. 
Tiltnes explain the conditions that drive 
some young people to emigrate
Th ose who cannot aff ord to be without a job must work, 
and may accept conditions they would rather avoid
 'Challenge' by 
Peter Hudston. This 
photograph was taken 
in Muscat, Oman in 
April 2015
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Th e extent of traditional informality can 
be indicated by the relatively high degree 
of self-employment, i.e. between 20 and 30 
per cent. In contrast, the average for the EU 
countries is 16.5 per cent. 
Th e new precariousness can be 
approximated by considering people 
working in the formal sector with only 
temporary jobs or no contract, something 
that is the situation for 43 per cent of the 
youth employed in the government sector in 
both Tunisia and Turkey. Th e fi gures for the 
other countries are lower, but still substantial 
with Morocco at 13 per cent, Lebanon at 
19 per cent and Palestine at 36 per cent. 
Not surprisingly, the situation in the private 
sector is worse: Lebanon apparently has 
the best conditions with 40 per cent of 
the youth having permanent jobs with 
contracts, while at the other end of the scale 
only 7 per cent of privately employed youth 
in Palestine have a permanent job with a 
contract. Overall, three quarters of young 
Lebanese and Turks have a job they consider 
permanent, which is twice the proportion of 
Palestine, Egypt, Tunisia and Morocco. 
Young people in the southern and eastern 
Mediterranean tend to work long hours with 
a typical work week lasting 40-50 hours, 
and in some countries (Palestine, Tunisia, 
Lebanon, Turkey) more than one in ten 
works in excess of 60 hours per week. Given 
the informality of employment relations, 
it should come as little surprise that young 
people’s access to non-pay benefi ts is 
limited. In Palestine, for instance, only 24 
per cent have paid sick leave, 12 per cent 
have a right to maternity/paternity leave, 
13 per cent report access to a lump-sum 
retirement pension whilst 9 per cent have 
retirement benefi ts in the form of monthly 
stipends. Owing to the higher formalisation 
of employment relations, the situation 
is considerably better in Lebanon and 
Turkey, somewhat better in Morocco and 
Tunisia, but even poorer in Egypt, where 
three quarters of working youth report no 
employment benefi ts at all.
Th e employment incomes of youth 
captured by the POWER2YOUTH surveys 
are meagre; a median net monthly earning 
of €105 in Egypt and €357 in Palestine. 
Notwithstanding such low income levels, 
many youth express satisfaction with their 
earnings: Lebanon, 75 per cent; Turkey, 68 
per cent; Morocco, 60 per cent; Tunisia, 
45 per cent; Palestine, 43 per cent; and 
Egypt, 41 per cent. Th is paradox should, 
of course, be understood in circumstances 
characterised by excessive unemployment 
and high poverty rates: some income 
is better than no income. Highlighting 
the precarious employment relation in 
this region, the fear of losing one’s job is 
widespread amongst the young and voiced 
by 72 per cent in Egypt, 67 per cent in 
Palestine, 64 per cent in Tunisia, 63 per cent 
in Turkey, and 53 per cent in both Morocco 
and Lebanon.
Developed welfare states have established 
safety nets both within and outside of 
the work place through a complex web 
of state regulations, labour union eff orts 
and civil society participation. Oft en a 
tripartite cooperation of the state, labour 
unions and employer organisations has 
been central. However, in the south-eastern 
Mediterranean, the surveys show that the 
youth of today has lost or never developed 
confi dence and trust in such institutions. 
For example, a majority of youth, ranging 
from 71 per cent in Egypt to 90 per cent in 
Tunisia express little or no confi dence at 
all in labour unions. Similarly, 88 per cent 
of Tunisian and 89 per cent of Lebanese 
youth do not trust their governments. 
Trust is higher in Turkey, with ‘only’ 49 per 
cent of young people having little or no 
trust in the government. (Dis)trust in local 
government is at about the same level as 
(dis)trust in central government, and trust 
in political parties, the parliaments, the civil 
service and humanitarian organisations 
is similarly dismal. Asked to assess the 
eff orts of their respective governments to 
secure employment for young people, the 
percentage of youth who are very or rather 
dissatisfi ed varies from a ‘low’ of 50 per cent 
in Turkey to 83 per cent in Palestine and 89 
per cent in Tunisia. 
In light of the combined challenges 
of unemployment, informality and 
precariousness, this lack of trust in key social 
institutions that in principle should help 
them address such problems means youth 
in the southern and eastern Mediterranean 
see few options in their struggles to make 
a life for themselves at home. Given these 
conditions, migration is a logical response.
Jon Pedersen is a Researcher at Fafo, Norway. 
Trained as a Social Anthropologist he is also 
specialised in survey statistics and population 
studies. He has been conducting research 
in the Middle East for more than 20 years, 
mostly focussing on Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, 
Egypt, Palestine and Jordan
Åge A. Tiltnes is a Researcher at the 
Norwegian Research Foundation Fafo. With 
an academic degree in political science, Tiltnes 
has conducted survey-based research in 
Jordan, Palestine, Lebanon and Syria for more 
than 20 years. Palestinian, Iraqi and Syrian 
refugees, their rights and the link between 
rights, on the one hand, and livelihoods 
and policies, on the other, have been crucial 
aspects of his work
Th e fear of losing one’s job is widespread amongst the young
'Crowd' by Jacqueline Mahan. This photograph 
was taken in Taksim in Istanbul, Turkey in 2016
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Youth migration from Arab and Muslim countries is today the main electoral target for populist 
movements in the West. Th e political and 
economic tensions of the 2000s that led to 
the Arab revolts in 2011, ensuing regime 
changes, economic crises and socio-
political instability indeed spurred growing 
migration pressure from the Arab region, as 
witnessed during the years 2015 and 2016. 
Yet, migration from Muslim countries had 
been seen as a security threat in the West 
since the early 2000s, following the 9/11 
attacks. Consequently, immigration policies 
increasingly aimed at limiting migration 
and at controlling its composition. Have 
EU policies eff ectively shaped the size 
and composition of migration from the 
MENA region since then? Do alternative 
destinations to the EU exist for these young 
migrants, for instance the Gulf States? How 
will the sealing of EU (and the Gulf States’) 
borders aff ect these regions’ security?
Most North African and Turkish migrants 
choose Europe as a major destination. 
However, migrating there is increasingly 
diffi  cult for these young nationals. First, 
the Schengen Agreements (1985) led to 
the strengthening of EU’s external borders, 
to counterbalance the creation of an area 
of free circulation within the Union. 
Second, while the ‘Europeanisation’ of the 
migration agenda emphasised migrants’ 
rights, promoted development in migrant-
sending countries, and looked to attract 
more immigrant labour to ‘eliminate 
bottlenecks in the labour market’, it was also 
infl uenced by populist stances against EU 
enlargement. Th e events of 9/11 spurred 
suspicion towards Muslim populations, 
which further enhanced the ‘securitisation’ 
of the migration issue over the 2000s. 
Curbing ‘irregular’ migration thus became 
the fourth pillar of EU migration policies. 
Existing rules of legal entry and sojourn in 
the EU were strengthened and the sending 
countries came under pressure to control 
the exit of their own nationals, as well 
as that of nationals from third countries 
transiting through their territory on their 
way to Europe. Th is de facto ‘externalisation’ 
of EU border control was reinforced in 
response to the Arab revolts, especially with 
the signing of Mobility Partnerships with 
Morocco (2013), Tunisia and Jordan (2014), 
and with a Readmission Agreement passed 
with Turkey (December 2013). Th e latter 
links the pursuit of Turkey’s EU accession 
process, and eventually the visa-free access 
to Schengen space for Turkish nationals, 
to the country’s management of irregular 
migrants – i.e. their arrests in Turkey and 
the readmission of those captured inside EU 
borders. 
Th ese policies had dire consequences for 
young Arabs and Turks. Eurostat records 
indicate, fi rst, a drop in the number of 
new residency permits granted to these 
nationals. Moroccans, for instance, received 
203,670 permits in 2008 and only 96,099 
Securitising youth 
migration to the 
EU and the Gulf: 
a time bomb?
Françoise De Bel-Air examines 
changing policies towards MENA youth 
migration and their implications
Following the 9/11 attacks, immigration policies increasingly 
aimed at limiting migration and at controlling its composition
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Ignoring the socio-political factors that still act as ‘push’ factors 
commits the EU to privileging regimes that effi  ciently control 
their borders but display anti-democratic tendencies
in 2015. Th is indicates the progressive 
closure of avenues of legal immigration to 
the EU. Second, the structure of migration 
fl ows changed. Th e policy objective of 
‘better management of legal migration’ 
streamlined specifi c categories of migrants. 
Among those immigrating for the purpose 
of working (‘remunerated activities’), the 
‘highly skilled workers’ and ‘researchers’ 
were the only ones to increase in numbers 
since 2008. In general, however, work is no 
longer the main avenue of migration to the 
EU. As of 2015, 60 per cent of Tunisians 
entered the EU as ‘family dependants’, 
compared to 40 per cent in 2008; 74 per 
cent of them were joining a spouse or 
partner in the EU. Th ird, the dynamics 
of youth migration also changed and the 
duration of young migrants’ stays in the EU 
have become shorter. Th e share of residency 
permits granted for less than one year 
increased notably between 2008 and 2015, 
from 22 to 40 per cent of all fi rst permits 
granted to Turkish sojourners, for instance. 
Destinations other than the EU also 
increasingly closed their doors to young 
MENA citizens. Australia’s and Canada’s 
point-based immigration systems allow 
only small numbers of highly-educated 
and skilled young migrants into these 
countries. Th e six Gulf States, the privileged 
destination for young Egyptians and Middle 
East Arabs, strictly limit family reunion 
and deny foreigners avenues for settlement, 
since these are considered guest labourers 
on limited duration contracts. Since 2011, 
various measures were enacted to limit the 
numbers of selected Arab nationals. Amid 
general economic slowdown due to a fall in 
oil prices, drastic workforce nationalisation 
measures were passed, which could make 
certain categories of migrant workers 
redundant. Egyptians in Saudi Arabia, 
for instance, are oft en employed in white-
collar, skilled and semi-skilled technical 
fi elds; yet, these are increasingly claimed by 
unemployed Saudis. Th e political crises that 
sending and receiving countries faced since 
2011 have also aff ected Arab expatriates 
in the Gulf: several waves of Lebanese 
expatriates were expelled from the UAE, 
some under the accusation of sympathy 
with Hezbollah. Hiring bans have also 
targeted Tunisians, Syrians and Egyptians in 
several Gulf States, as authorities feared the 
migrants could import political strife from 
their countries to the Gulf. 
Such policy trends aff ecting the size, 
structure and dynamics of MENA youth 
migration could have several socio-political 
consequences. First, the continuous 
contraction of immigration opportunities 
signals the persistence of a depoliticising 
approach to migration as essentially 
driven by attraction (‘pull’) factors of an 
economic nature. Th erefore, ignoring 
the socio-political factors that still act as 
‘push’ factors (poverty, unemployment, 
underdevelopment, nepotism and political 
repression, not to mention wars) de facto 
commits the EU to privileging regimes that 
effi  ciently control their borders but display 
anti-democratic tendencies. Th e EU-Turkey 
Agreements of December 2013 and March 
2016 illustrate that point. Second, the 
stigmatisation of unmarried, low-skilled, 
economically active, young male migrants 
combined with the prominence of family 
reunion schemes over labour immigration 
paradoxically seems to encourage migrant 
families’ long-term settlement. Restricting 
circulation (exits and re-entries) may be 
the only way to keep EU borders sealed. 
However, constrained settlement may 
benefi t receiving societies less than the 
chosen mobility of young professionals. 
Th ird, indeed, the (imposed) increasingly 
short-term employment mobility schemes 
risk bringing EU policies closer to Gulf 
States’ ‘guest workers’ schemes, which 
perform a ‘subordinate inclusion’ of 
migrants: these are economically included 
(yet, compelled to work under conditions 
and for wages that locals shun), but at 
the same time prevented from social and 
cultural inclusion in host societies. Last 
but not least, the lack of legal migration 
channels and the strengthened policy focus 
on deterring ‘irregularity’ overlook the well-
documented fact that this combination of 
measures actually produces more irregular 
migration.
Freedom to move is enshrined in Article 
13 of the 1948 Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. Yet, it does not include 
the right to enter and live in any other 
country, ‘hence the central importance 
of immigration policy’ (Skeldon, R., 
Skilled Migration: Boon or Bane?, 2009). 
However, current policy orientations are 
not only economically and politically 
frustrating for young migrants, they are also 
counterproductive for receiving societies.
Françoise De Bel-Air is a Research 
Consultant, specialising in the demography 
of Arab countries. Her recent publications 
include Chapter 7 ‘Exclusion, mobility and 
migration’ of the Arab Human Development 
Report 2016 on Youth.
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Youth prospects in Lebanon: 
tenuous possibilities amidst a bleak reality
The Lebanese state functions essentially as a political system sealed by hegemonic political-
sectarian parties operating in competition 
and complementarity. Attempts to break 
this hegemony (from within or outside 
the system) result in small gains (like 
the municipal elections in 1998) that do 
not fundamentally challenge the system’s 
elaborate machinery. Perversely, many 
attempts, like the Independence Intifada, 
get co-opted and end up reinforcing 
the system’s domination. Th e Election 
Law, which could serve as a substantive 
channel for political and social change, is 
another domain where reforms have fallen 
short: parliamentary elections still obey a 
political sectarian logic that facilitates the 
reproduction of existing power groups 
and the consolidation of their sectarian 
territories. Th e Election Law excludes from 
voting people below 21 years of age. It also 
restricts that act of voting to a person’s 
original birthplace, even though this is 
oft en a remote village or town they left  
generations ago. For instance, out of the 
1.4 million Lebanese who inhabit the city 
of Beirut, a mere 400,000 people choose 
their parliamentarian representatives and 
their municipal councillors. Moreover, 
the procedure for changing one’s place of 
registration is neither socially or politically 
acceptable, nor facilitated administratively.
Within this locked political economy, 
public offi  cials have two discourses on 
youth. Th e fi rst is a public discourse that 
celebrates a specifi c category of Lebanese 
youth, namely those who are successful 
and who manage to emigrate. Th ey 
are usually highly educated and highly 
skilled young men and women destined 
to broaden their horizons and carry 
Mona Harb examines the fragmented 
and depoliticising public policy discourses 
on Lebanese youth, and how new youth 
coalitions are attempting to challenge the 
locked political system
Lebanese youth are constructed through fragmented 
lenses and are the recipients of policies that are 
partial, unresponsive and oft en irrelevant
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Community meeting in a public garden 
organised by Beirut Madinati (the independent 
campaign for 2016 municipal elections), 2016© 
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Amidst this bleak reality, some youth initiatives do 
provide tenuous possibilities for political change
Lebanon’s name to great heights. And, if 
they are really successful, they re-invest 
their capital in the country. Th ey are, 
however, not expected to return or to vote 
while they are abroad. 
Th e second public discourse stigmatises 
‘the other youth’, those who are poorly 
educated and unskilled, those who are seen 
as potentially subversive troublemakers 
and those that need to be policed and 
controlled. Th ese youngsters are oft en the 
main target of sectarian political parties, 
who present viable employment and 
social services opportunities. Th ey are 
typically categorised into two gendered 
groups: single young men with few 
qualifi cations or skills and a propensity to 
become radicalised, and/or single young 
women who will marry late or not at all 
and become spinsters – both ultimately 
becoming burdens on society. 
Lebanese youth are hence constructed 
through fragmented lenses and are the 
recipients of policies that are partial, 
unresponsive and oft en irrelevant. Young 
people are marginalised into a peripheral 
ministry – the Ministry of Youth and 
Sports – where their issues are reduced to 
social and cultural concerns and divorced 
from politics under the fake narrative 
of separating politics and confl ict from 
society. Th e tentative attempt to develop 
a Youth National Policy ended up being 
co-opted by youth wings of political 
parties and diluted into a generic policy 
agenda. Instead, youth policies ought to be 
elaborated relationally, taking into account 
a multiplicity of indicators that reveal how 
being young is a diverse and subjective 
experience that intersects with other 
relationships and inequalities.
International donors address youth 
better, mostly via funding provided to 
NGOs which translates into political, social 
and rights-based initiatives. However, as 
Nagel and Staeheli argue in their article 
‘International Donors, NGOs, and the 
Geopolitics of Youth Citizenship in 
Contemporary Lebanon’ (Geopolitics, 
2017), donors mostly advance their own 
geopolitical agendas, promoting youth’s 
depoliticisation ‘by shift ing political 
energies away from “sectarian politics” 
and towards pragmatic problem-solving 
at the local scale’. Th e private sector also 
contributes to the youths’ depoliticisation 
by categorising them as future successful 
entrepreneurs, who should aim to become 
competitive capitalists in the market 
economy.
Amidst this bleak reality, some youth 
initiatives do provide tenuous possibilities 
for political change. Aft er the assassination 
of Prime Minister Rafi c Hariri in 2005 
and the withdrawal of the Syrian army 
from Lebanon, a new typology of youth 
groups emerged to challenge the sectarian 
and corrupt political system and to shape 
youth’s political consciousness. Th ese 
groups were keen on specifi c issues: 
reclaiming the Parliament as a legislative 
institution, protecting a threatened section 
of Beirut’s coast, fi ghting a highway 
cutting across a heritage neighbourhood, 
reclaiming a closed-off  public park, 
demanding a sound waste management 
policy or reclaiming the municipality as 
an organisation of city planning. Many of 
these groups operated as a loose coalition 
of individuals without clear leadership or 
a defi nite membership. Many intentionally 
avoided registering as NGOs and 
experimented with horizontal and fl exible 
forms of organisational structures. Th ey 
learned from other activist movements’ 
experiences and tactics in the Arab region 
and beyond. Th ey were keen on informing 
their actions with research and expertise 
and by investigating how the law can best 
serve their aims. Th ey relied extensively 
on social media platforms to exchange 
information, debate, and mobilise. Th ey 
appropriated streets and open spaces, 
claiming their rights to the city. 
However, as expected, the ruling 
oligarchy intervened to protect its interests 
and did not let such mobilisations 
coalesce: Salloukh et al. in Th e Politics of 
Sectarianism in Postwar Lebanon (2015) 
discuss how they halted eff orts using a 
range of strategies varying between co-
optation, manipulation, neutralisation, 
and/or violent repression. Th e youth 
groups themselves did not manage to 
crystallise into a consistent, durable 
political movement that could plausibly 
challenge the oligarchy due to limited 
resources as well as internal dissent and/
or rivalry. Th e fact that the oligarchy 
had systematically dismantled labour 
unions certainly does not help advance 
possibilities for political change either. Th e 
journey to change is indeed arduous, and it 
will require extensive and relentless eff orts 
– but the fi rst seeds toward political change 
have been planted.
Mona Harb is Professor of Urban Studies 
and Politics at the American University of 
Beirut. She is the Co-author of Leisurely 
Islam: Negotiating Geography and 
Morality in Shi'ite South Beirut (Princeton 
University Press, 2013) and the Co-editor 
of Local Governments and Public Goods: 
Assessing Decentralization in the Arab 
World (Beirut: LCPS, 2015). She has 
been the PI of the Lebanon chapter for the 
POWER2YOUTH collaborative research 
project (2014-17)
Cover page of the Lebanese Youth Policy 
Document published in 2011
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It is widely recognised that the youth played a key role in the Arab uprisings of 2010/11. While youth 
demonstrations and contestations have 
since receded, they have left  an indelible 
mark: these young participants have 
developed new patterns for civic and 
political engagement. 
Aft er almost three years of extensive 
fi eldwork with young people in the MENA 
region, especially in Egypt, my research 
(within the scope of the POWER2YOUTH 
project) reveals interesting trends. Whereas 
in Europe, distrust in institutions is 
largely associated with youth abstention 
from political participation, it seems that 
distrust in MENA is actually positively 
related to youth participation. While trust 
levels amongst young people in the region 
are generally very low, young activists 
in particular tend to be more suspicious 
and less trustful than other youth in the 
region. Th e relations between distrust, civic 
and political engagement has developed 
into new and unconventional forms of 
participation in the region. 
Trust in the military tends to be highest 
among MENA’s youth, however, trust in 
other formal institutions – like the police, 
courts, parliaments, political parties, 
central and local governments – is rather 
very low when compared to the rest of the 
world. Trust levels are a refl ection of young 
people’s understandings and perceptions 
of the political systems they live in. For 
instance, young people in Turkey tend 
to have higher levels of trust in their 
institutions than the rest of the MENA 
regimes. Trust in the courts is also very low 
in the region, and can be related to young 
people’s perception of corruption. Young 
people argue that there is no due process 
and that the law is selectively applied 
against opposition fi gures in countries like 
Morocco, Egypt, Tunisia and Turkey. 
Young people perceive the political elite, 
whether pro-regime or in the opposition, 
to be corrupt. In Tunisia for instance, 
young members of political parties do not 
trust the political parties they belong to 
themselves. Th ey argue that the leadership 
is interested in defending their personal 
The curious 
blend of youth 
participation 
and distrust in 
institutions
Nadine Sika outlines how distrust 
increased political and social activism 
among young people in MENA
Young people perceive the political elite, whether 
pro-regime or in the opposition, to be corrupt
YOUTH PRECARITY IN MENA
Cairo, Egypt
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Istanbul, Turkey
Young people are pushing the limits for more change, 
inclusion and civic and political participation
interests rather than the interests of the 
country at large. Some have asserted that 
in the 2014 parliamentary elections, young 
members were excluded from the Nida’ 
Tunis party’s electoral list. Unsurprisingly 
MENA parliaments have the lowest trust 
levels amongst young people worldwide. 
For instance in Morocco, young people are 
more interested in unconventional forms 
of civic and political participation rather 
than in formal political participation; 
some Moroccan activists have argued that 
they are not interested in participating 
in parliamentary elections, because they 
believe that political reforms are only 
cosmetic.
Interestingly enough, this rising 
distrust toward formal institutions in 
the aft ermath of the Arab uprisings 
manifested in new ways of civic and 
political participation. In Lebanon, young 
people have time and again articulated 
their frustration with formal politics 
and with civil society organisations, as 
exemplifi ed by the #YouStink movement. 
Th ough the movement initially mobilised 
against the rising environmental hazards 
and uncleanliness in Beirut, young 
activists’ demands surpassed this. As the 
demonstrations developed, transparency 
and accountability in the governance 
process became one of their major 
demands. In Turkey young people who 
actively engaged in the Gezi Park protests 
felt that it was impossible for them to 
change mainstream politics. Instead they 
chose to participate through informal 
channels and organisations, protest 
movements or demonstrations. Aft er 
the Gezi Park protests, young activists 
continued to mobilise and work apart from 
the conventional political parties and civil 
society organisations. Th ey developed 
new urban solidarity movements, like 
the Caferağa Dayanışması (Caferağa 
Neighbourhood Solidarity) whose main 
goal is to resist large urban projects. 
Other new forms of participation can be 
seen in the development of small, issue-
oriented initiatives by a small number 
of young activists. In Egypt for instance, 
in the two years following the uprising a 
plethora of small initiatives developed. Of 
these, the No to Military Trials initiative 
stands out: members would screen movies 
demonstrating the brutality of military 
trials against civilians in major city squares 
or in front of public buildings. In Turkey, 
We Will Stop Femicide was essential in 
bringing the issue of female murders to the 
forefront of political debates. Th en there 
is the Electronic Intifada in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territories. Th is ‘Intifada’ 
provides a Palestinian perspective on the 
Israeli-Palestinian confl ict and makes it 
available to try to counterbalance Western, 
pro-Israeli media. In Morocco, initiatives 
like Falsafa fi  Zanka (‘Philosophy in the 
Street’) and Café Citoyen (‘Citizen Coff ee 
Shop’) develop youth-led cultural and 
intellectual associations to raise political 
and social awareness among Moroccan 
youth. 
Th ough trust levels are very low and 
venues for youth participation are being 
closed off  by MENA regimes, young 
people are still fi nding ways to alter and 
infl uence the public sphere through their 
mere presence and operation in society. 
Instead of abstaining from participation 
and waiting for MENA regimes to open 
political opportunities, many young people 
are carving out their own opportunities. 
Instead of waiting on the government to 
generate jobs, they have developed their 
own youth-led employment initiatives 
and small business start-ups. When 
the crackdown occurred on public 
demonstrations, street activism moved 
online and began crowd-funding. Young 
people are pushing the limits for more 
change, inclusion and civic and political 
participation. Th ough it seems that 
authoritarian rule is entrenched in MENA 
polities, these young activist demonstrate 
that people who are able to resist and 
instigate change through peaceful, indirect 
and incremental means still exist.
Nadine Sika is Assistant Professor of 
Comparative Politics at the American 
University in Cairo (AUC). She is author of 
Youth Activism and Contentious Politics 
in Egypt: Dynamics of Continuity and 
Change (Cambridge University Press, 
forthcoming). She is also Co-editor of 
Th e Arab Uprisings: Transforming and 
Challenging State Power (IB Tauris, 2015).
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YOUTH PRECARITY IN MENA
Precarity’ is increasingly used to describe the detrimental combined eff ects of the economic crisis and of 
European austerity on youth transitions. 
Read through Bourdieu, it refers to a 
multidimensional ‘weight of the world’, 
embodying ‘social suff ering’ through 
degradation of work, demoralisation and 
lavish social vulnerability. Th is process of 
material and immaterial deprivation is seen 
to provoke – similar to Polanyi’s proposition 
relating to the social crisis of the 1930s – the 
contentious anti-precarity movements of 
today. 
Translated into a social movements 
discourse, ‘precarity’ represents a signifi er of 
struggle, describing a possible rallying point 
for resistance, an interpellation of youth 
social movements generating bold narratives 
for contesting old power structures – 
political, social and ideological – and 
uprooting older generations from their 
certainties. It encompasses contemporary 
transformations and struggles of varying 
shapes and scales in diff erent parts of the 
world: from the youth mobilisations of 
the Arab Spring to Brazil’s Tropical Spring 
movement, and to Spain’s and Greece’s 
Indignants. Th ese anti-precarity struggles 
appear to share common features in 
terms of contesting the relevance of policy 
environments in mitigating contemporary 
risks while denoting a disposition for agency 
and readiness to make youth voices better 
heard. 
A critical question, embodied in 
contemporary youth anti-precarity struggles 
is how precarity mobilises contention 
and whether it embodies transformatory 
potential. Th us broader research on youth 
precarity, resistance and participation is 
emerging in social and political studies, 
bringing to the fore important questions and 
calling for a deeper understanding of youth 
agency and social change. When and how do 
anti-precarity activists achieve their goals? 
Is protest mobilisation a suffi  cient condition 
for mitigating the unequal burdening of 
toxic risk experienced by young people 
globally? 
Th ese questions have been uppermost 
in the context of debates about the MENA 
youth aft er the Arab uprisings, and this 
article draws some parallels from the recent 
Greek experiences. Th e story of youth 
struggles through the recent Indignant 
movement in Greece off ers a fecund point 
for understanding the potential and the 
limitations of precarity as a force driving 
transformation. 
Over the past six years the combined 
eff ects of an acute economic crisis and the 
politics of austerity have contributed to 
increasing deterioration of youth working 
conditions and livelihoods in Greece. Th ese 
spaces of precarity have sharpened resistance 
manifested in mass mobilisations, some 
of the most impressive instances of which 
have been the May-July 2011 protests of the 
Indignant movement (or Aganiktismenoi 
in Greek). Inspired by the events of the 
Arab Spring, and in particular by the all-out 
occupation of Tahrir Square, Indignants 
occupied Syntagma Square in front of 
Anti-precarity struggles appear to share common 
features in terms of contesting the relevance of policy 
environments while denoting a disposition for agency
The unfi nished story of youth 
precarity and struggle in Greece
Maria M. Mexi looks back at the youth 
struggles in one of the deepest economic 
and political crises to aff ect a southern 
European country and draws parallels with 
the MENA region
‘
Image of Syntagma 
Square where 100,000 
people gathered 
on 29 May 2011 
to protest against 
austerity measures. 
Photograph by 
Kotsolis at English 
Wikipedia© 
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Parliament in Athens, erecting protest camps 
lasting for several weeks. Participation 
was overwhelming; at their height, these 
gatherings of the Indignants drew up to 
100,000 people. 
Young activists were prominent. Th e 
Guardian saw the active engagement of 
young Greek activists in the 2011 collective 
mobilisations as a basis for larger political 
agency: ‘What marked out this summer’s 
demonstrations in Athens’ Syntagma 
Square and across the country was the high 
proportion of young people: hyper-educated, 
under-employed and radicalized… [It’s] 
this class – the young, with a sense of being 
cheated out of a decent future – combined 
with the public sector workers facing job 
losses and drops in pensions and salaries, 
who combine into the most interesting 
political force’. 
Th e Indignant movement was crucial in 
reinforcing young Greeks’ growing readiness 
to adopt forms of activism as a way of 
striking back against precarity, which was 
seen as part of a ‘failed system’. Th e main 
slogan of the Egyptian Arab Spring – ‘Bread, 
freedom, human dignity’ – which called for 
resistance against poor economic conditions, 
inequality and lack of democracy, was 
enthusiastically taken up by the young 
Greek Indignants. Just before the unfolding 
of the debt crisis of 2010, ‘generation 700 
Euros’ was used as a term best codifying the 
challenges facing young Greeks, who were 
underpaid, debt-ridden and insecure. As 
the crisis started, precarity was instrumental 
in unleashing and legitimising a torrent 
of moral outrage, which gradually led to 
mobilising and radicalising young people 
not only toward the far-right but also toward 
the far-left  of the political system; thereby, 
pointing to a ‘two-way radicalization’, which 
was particularly evident in the Indignants’ 
mobilisations.
During the 2011 mobilisations, protestors 
had diverse and rather confl icting political 
claims and identities. Left -wing Indignants 
called for ‘Direct democracy now!’, 
distancing themselves from the Arab Spring 
protestors’ call for ‘Real democracy now’ 
and emphasising that their claims were 
incompatible with the offi  cial institutions 
of representative democracy that had 
prioritised elites’ interests over their own. 
For the (extreme) right-wing Indignants, 
politicians’ management of the crisis was 
not simply an issue of the ineffi  ciency 
of representative democracy and social 
injustice. It was primarily an issue of national 
treason and the necessity of imposing 
punishment. Hence, while problems like 
poverty and increasing precarity had 
managed to unite numerous and diverse 
groups of young people (from working class 
to middle class strata), political priorities 
and value predispositions oft en competed in 
moulding their we-ness or collective identity 
(which usually defi nes a social movement).
Not only is the story of the Greek 
Indignant movement informative regarding 
how precarity experienced by young people 
may in certain conditions become a vehicle 
for mobilisation and resistance, but also in 
terms of how its transformative potential has 
been played out in the social and political 
domains. Th e movement’s imprint upon 
the Greek psyche has had tremendous 
repercussions in restructuring the party 
system away from the domination of a two-
party confi guration, while allowing new or 
transformed political actors to enter the fi eld 
with high prospects of success. Yet, none of 
the current political forces (left  or right-
wing) have so far managed to express the 
young people’s voices or to convince a large 
proportion of young Greeks that they have 
viable answers to their problems.
Apart from its immediate impact on the 
party system, the 2011 Indignant movement 
does not seem to have brought about an 
overwhelming change in the sense of 
upsetting the structural transformations 
causing youth precarity. Whereas young 
Greek Indignants were able to mobilise on 
the basis of what they did not like (lower 
pay, greater insecurity, unaccountable 
politicians), they were less successful 
in refl ecting what they would like, as 
competing political identities prevented 
them from always identifying positively 
with each other. In this sense, young anti-
precarity Indignants were not able to move 
from protest to politics by consolidating a 
shared transformatory agenda of the many 
diff erent young people they represented and 
pushing this agenda into the policies and 
institutions of Greece.
Just like the aft ermath of the Arab Spring 
has left  many of its young protagonists 
disillusioned, today Greece's young people 
are still vulnerable and scorned. With 
major grievances still unmet, the story of 
the 2011 anti-precarity struggles appears, 
in Gramscian terms, to have heralded a 
moment of crisis where the old is dying 
but where what is yet to be born remains 
obscured.
Maria M. Mexi studied Politics at Oxford and 
Social Policy at LSE. She is a Senior Research 
Fellow at the Institute of Citizenship Studies of 
the University of Geneva and a contributor to 
Insidestory.gr
None of the current political forces have so far managed 
to express the young people’s voices or to convince young 
Greeks that they have viable answers to their problems
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Over one million people gathered in Tahrir 
Square in February 2011 demanding that 
president Hosni Mubarak step down. 
Photograph by Jonathan Rashad
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Discourses of Ideology 
and Identity: Social 
Media and the Iranian 
Election Protests
By Chris Featherman
Reviewed by Mohsen Biparva
Routledge, 2015, £95.00
REVIEWS: BOOKS
Much has been said about the Iranian election of 2009 and the subsequent protests. 
Th e protesters’ use of Twitter, a new 
phenomenon at the time, resulted in the 
unrest being dubbed a ‘Twitter Revolution’ 
(Andrew Sullivan, Th e Atlantic, 13 June 
2009). Th ere was much enthusiasm in the 
air about the liberating power of Twitter 
and its role in spreading democracy. Other 
observers, such as Evgeny Morozov in 
his book Th e Net Delusion: Th e Dark Side 
of Internet Freedom (2011), who labelled 
the aforementioned enthusiasm as ‘cyber-
utopianism’ were not so optimistic about the 
whole process.
Discourses of Ideology and Identity, 
written by Chris Featherman, applies 
several theories to establish the link between 
language and ‘new media’ discourse 
by specifi cally looking at Iran and the 
‘Twitter Revolution’. It looks at the role of 
ICTs (Information and Communications 
Technology) in the shift  towards network 
society and the role of language in 
globalisation. Social media – like Twitter 
– have brought new possibilities, but they 
have also increased the risk of information 
overload and reinforced the tendency to 
make snap judgements, side-lining a more 
lengthy engagement in social dialogue.
Featherman’s book is mainly about Critical 
Discourse Analysis (CDA), which, at its 
heart, is a set of tools that enables researchers 
in the social sciences and humanities to 
analyse language materials, such as written 
texts or conversations. Essentially it entails 
borrowing tools from linguistics for use in 
the social sciences. Discourse analysis in 
the social sciences in particular is informed 
by the works of Michel Foucault. With 
this Foucauldian orientation, CDA takes 
a critical attitude toward the structural 
relationships of power and dominance to try 
to disclose power relations, discriminations 
and inequalities inscribed in texts. Here 
language is not merely a tool or a medium 
of communication but rather a constructive 
part of social life.  
CDA has had its critics. Among other 
things, it is mainly criticised for being too 
political and less scientifi c: by drawing 
from eclectic theories such as Foucault’s 
formulation of power/knowledge and 
discourse, Gramsci’s notion of hegemony, 
Althusser’s concept of interpellation and 
so forth it is seen as lacking a specifi c and 
unitary theoretical framework. Featherman’s 
aim is to fi nd a way to apply CDA to a socio-
political issue by addressing these criticisms. 
His way forward entails forgetting CDA 
as a theory or method and accepting it as 
a series of interdisciplinary approaches. 
He maintains that his work is not a case of 
theoretical eclecticism. To make it more 
scientifi c and less prone to political bias, he 
applies a research approach within CDA, 
known as the Sociocognitive Approach 
formulated by Teun van Dijk. Th e 
Sociocognitive Approach, as Featherman 
puts it, ‘considers social cognition as the 
interface between society and discourse’ 
(p. 42). Th us he looks to maintain the 
critical vigour of CDA against claims of 
discrimination and racism by including an 
analysis of behaviour and language. 
His approach marks a third path 
between the aforementioned optimism and 
pessimism towards the new media. He is not 
completely optimistic that ICTs and the new 
media will (eventually) promote democracy 
and liberal values. Neither though is he too 
pessimistic to believe that every discourse 
in the new media is ultimately determined 
by hegemonic powers, big players and the 
like. He shows, through his example tweets, 
that creating new network identities and 
global solidarities free from geographical 
boundaries, all via a text medium – the 
tweet, is possible through the formation 
of new counter discourses and the 
legitimisation of new forms of resistance 
against dominant ideologies as an ongoing 
battle for power and infl uence.  
Th e book provides useful insights for 
understanding relations between old and 
new media and the role of language in 
social media. As the emergence of new 
online identities, imagined transnational 
communities and online affi  liations become 
more important, having access to this set 
of tools is essential. However, it remains 
diffi  cult for the reader to distinguish 
between Featherman’s ‘interdisciplinary’ 
approach and the oft -criticised ‘eclectic’ 
approach in CDA.
Mohsen Biparva is an independent scholar, 
researcher, writer and art critic. He writes 
on contemporary art, cinema, media and 
culture. He has a PhD in Media Arts from the 
University of London
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The Making of a Salafi  
Muslim Woman: Paths 
to Conversion
By Anabel Inge
Reviewed by Sarah Stewart
Oxford University Press, November 2016, £22.99
In December 2015, Chancellor Merkel declared that ‘Multiculturalism creates parallel societies and remains a Grand 
Delusion’. President Sarkozy, in a speech 
in February 2011 was more forthright; 
‘Multiculturalism has failed’ he said, a view 
endorsed by at least half of the candidates 
in the forthcoming French presidential 
election. Meanwhile, the leitmotiv of the 
Trump campaign (both before and in offi  ce) 
‘Make America Great Again’ is understood 
by liberal America to contain a coded 
rejection of multiculturalism.
Whilst European and American storm 
clouds were gathering over the increasingly 
toxic issues of asylum and migration, 
Anabel Inge gained privileged and intimate 
access to a small group that in many 
ways symbolise the debate surrounding 
assimilation, laïcité and multiculturalism – 
British Salafi  women.
Over a period of several years, she gained 
both the confi dence and trust of twenty-
three converts, their teachers, imams and 
community leaders. It is a trust well earned. 
Yet distance and objectivity are maintained. 
In her own phrase, she sought ‘empathy, not 
sympathy’. 
What did she learn? In restrained, 
measured and accessible prose published 
in her book Th e Making of a Salafi  Muslim 
Woman, Inge debunks many of the easy 
assumptions that have dominated the public 
discourse. Each convert, no matter her 
ethnicity or social background, had agency. 
Th e proposition that they, or any of them, 
were victims of brainwashing is untenable 
and treated with derision by the women 
themselves. 
Th e most outward demonstration of 
agency is also the one most likely to be 
misunderstood by press and politician alike: 
dress. As ‘Safi a’ told Inge:
When you see a sister in a light blue 
abaya, you know with her yellow hijab, to 
me, it’s like she is trying to fi t into society, 
you know. Where you know from the Salafi  
sisters, when you just see the black, black, 
black niqab, niqab, niqab … I see them 
as very fi rm and not trying to conform to 
society at all. It’s like ‘I’m not even bothered 
about what you think of me’… Th e way I 
look at sisters with jilbab and niqab, I am 
truly inspired by them. (p. 91)
As Inge describes in Chapters 5 and 6, the 
life of a Salafi  woman in a liberal democracy 
is far from easy. Th e contradictions abound. 
Contrary to popular belief, Salafi  women 
are not required by their faith to remain at 
home, wholly dependent upon a husband 
or family. Yet higher education and the 
workplace are diffi  cult to navigate whilst 
remaining true to Salafi  core principles. As 
the author observes, these contain myriad 
injunctions and prohibitions that govern 
every aspect of day-to-day living. Young 
Salafi  women intent on avoiding the sin of 
‘free mixing’ will inevitably fi nd a university 
campus or lecture theatre a place of anxiety. 
Most employers, unless also Salafi , are 
understandably reluctant to remodel their 
working environment to accommodate the 
demands of strict segregation.
Inge also explores the theme of Salafi  
exclusivity within the Muslim world itself. 
Salafi sm holds that its practices alone are 
rooted in the early faith and therefore 
authentic, al-salaf al-salih. Any deviation 
is ‘reprehensible’, bida. Salafi s consequently 
claim that the famous hadith that consigns 
72 sects to the torments of hell, sparing 
but one, is irrefutable validation for the 
correctness of their beliefs. Salafi s are the 
‘Saved Sect’.
Unsurprisingly, such an interpretation 
is contested by non-Salafi s. As Inge 
succinctly describes, many voices within 
contemporary Islam compete to be heard, 
such that it can be particularly diffi  cult for 
the outsider to distinguish the signifi cant 
diff erences between them. 
Salafi sm rejects terrorism in any form. 
Th is matters, because groups that lay 
claim to the Salafi  name, or profess to have 
adopted Salafi  teaching and yet promote 
jihad (e.g. Al-Muhajiroun) have been 
roundly condemned and anathematised 
by Salafi  leaders. Yet this important and 
courageous stance has been largely ignored 
by both press and politician.
Anabel Inge has shown that Salafi sm 
is not the enemy within. More broadly, 
she has underscored the extent to which 
Islam is richly multifarious. Her book is 
useful reading for Western policy-makers 
everywhere.
Sarah Stewart is a member of the magazine’s 
Editorial Board
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Prozak Diaries is an analysis of emerging psychiatric discourses in post-1980s Iran. Th rough 
the lens of psychiatry, the book reveals how historical experiences are negotiated and 
how generations are formed. Orkideh Behrouzan traces the historical circumstances that 
prompted the development of psychiatric discourses in Iran and reveals the ways in which 
they both refl ect and actively shape Iranians’ cultural sensibilities. A physician and an 
anthropologist, she combines clinical and anthropological perspectives in order to investigate 
the grey areas between memory and everyday life, between individual symptoms and 
generational remembering. Prozak Diaries off ers an exploration of language as experience. 
In interpreting clinical and generational narratives, Behrouzan writes not only a history of 
psychiatry in contemporary Iran, but a story of how stories are told.
October 2016, Stanford University Press, £22.82
Prozak Diaries:
Psychiatry and Generational Memory in Iran
By Orkideh Behrouzan
Music was one of the fi rst casualties of the Iranian Revolution. It was banned in 1979, but it quickly 
crept back into Iranian culture and politics. Over time music provided an important political 
space where artists and audiences could engage in social and political debate. Now, more than 35 
years on, both the children of the revolution and their music have come of age. Soundtrack of the 
Revolution off ers an account of Iranian culture, politics and social change to provide an alternative 
history of the Islamic Republic. Drawing on over fi ve years of research in Iran, including during the 
2009 protests, Nahid Siamdoust introduces a full cast of characters, each with markedly diff erent 
political views and relations with the Iranian government. Taken together, these examinations of 
musicians and their music shed light on issues at the heart of debates in Iran – about its future and 
identity, changing notions of religious belief and the quest for political freedom.
January 2017, Stanford University Press, £20.99
Soundtrack of the Revolution:
The Politics of Music in Iran
By Nahid Siamdoust
Th e Constitutional Revolution of 1906 opened the way for enormous change in Persia, heralding 
the modern era and creating a model for later political and cultural movements in the region. Broad 
in its scope, this multidisciplinary volume brings together essays from leading scholars in Iranian 
Studies to explore the signifi cance of this revolution, its origins and the people who made it happen. 
As the authors show, this period was one of unprecedented debate within Iran’s burgeoning press. 
Many diff erent groups fought to shape the course of the revolution, which opened up seemingly 
boundless possibilities for the country’s future and aff ected nearly every segment of its society. 
Exploring themes such as the role of women, the use of photography and the uniqueness of the 
revolution as an Iranian experience, the authors tell a story of immense transition, as the old order 
of the Shah subsided and was replaced by a new social and political order.
November 2016, Gingko Library, £65.00
Iran’s Constitutional Revolution 
of 1906:
Narratives of the Enlightenment
Edited by Ali M. Ansari
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As the Middle East descends ever deeper into violence and chaos, ‘sectarianism’ has become 
a catch-all explanation for the region’s troubles. Th e turmoil is attributed to ‘ancient sectarian 
diff erences’, putatively primordial forces that make violent confl ict intractable. In media and 
policy discussions, sectarianism has come to possess trans-historical causal power. Th is book 
challenges the lazy use of ‘sectarianism’ as a magic-bullet explanation for the region’s ills, 
focussing on how various confl icts in the Middle East have morphed from non-sectarian (or 
cross-sectarian) and nonviolent movements into sectarian wars. Th rough multiple case studies 
–including Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Yemen and Kuwait – this book maps 
the dynamics of sectarianisation, exploring not only how but also why it has taken hold. Th e 
contributors examine the constellation of forces that drive the sectarianisation process and 
explore how the region’s politics can be de-sectarianised.
February 2017, Hurst, £20.00
Sectarianization: 
Mapping the New Politics of the Middle East
Edited by Nader Hasehmi and Danny Postel
More than 20 years have passed since Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization 
concluded the Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government 
Arrangements for Palestine. It was declared ‘a political breakthrough of immense importance.’ 
Israel offi  cially accepted the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, and 
the PLO recognised the right of Israel to exist. Critical views were voiced at the time about how 
the self-government established under the leadership of Yasser Arafat created a Palestinian-
administered Israeli occupation, rather than paving the way towards an independent Palestinian 
state. Th rough a number of essays written by renowned scholars and practitioners, the years 
since the Oslo Accords are scrutinised from a wide range of perspectives. Did the agreement 
have a reasonable chance of success? What went wrong, causing the treaty to derail and delay a 
real, workable solution? What are the recommendations today to show a way forward?
January 2017, Th e American University in Cairo Press, £24.95
The Oslo Accords:
A Critical Assessment
Edited by Petter Bauck and Mohammed Omer
Th e Husayni family of Jerusalem dominated Palestinian history for 250 years, from the 
Ottoman times through to the end of the British Mandate. At the height of the family’s 
political infl uence, positions in Jerusalem could only be obtained through its power base. In 
this political biography, Ilan Pappe traces the rise of the Husaynis from a provincial Ottoman 
elite clan into the leadership of the Palestinian national movement in the 20th century. In 
telling their story, Pappe highlights the continuous urban history of Jerusalem and Palestine. 
Shedding new light on crucial events such as the invasion of Palestine by Napoleon, the 
decline of the Ottoman Empire, WWI and the advent of Zionism, this account provides an 
unforgettable picture of the Palestinian tragedy in its entirety.
March 2017, Saqi Books, £12.99
The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian 
Dynasty:
The Husaynis 1700-1948
By Ilan Pappe
BOOKS IN BRIEF
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BOOKS IN BRIEF
In spite of harsh censorship, conservative morals and a lack of investment, women 
documentarists in the Arab world have found ways to subtly negotiate dissidence in their 
fi lms. In this book, Stefanie Van de Peer traces the beginnings of Arab women making 
documentaries in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Supporting a historical 
overview of the documentary form in the Arab world with a series of in-depth case studies, 
Van de Peer looks at the work of pioneering fi gures like Ateyyat El Abnoudy, the ‘mother of 
Egyptian documentary’, Tunisia’s Selma Baccar and the Palestinian fi lmmaker Mai Masri. 
Addressing the context of the fi lms’ production, distribution and exhibition, the book also 
asks why these women held on to the ideals of a type of fi lmmaking that was unlikely to be 
accepted by the censor, and looks at precisely how the women documentarists managed to 
frame expressions of dissent with the tools available to the documentary maker.
March 2017, Edinburgh University Press, £70.00
Negotiating Dissidence: 
The Pioneering Women of Arab Documentary
By Stefanie Van de Peer
Revered by some as the Arab Garibaldi, maligned by others as an intriguer and opportunist, 
Fawzi al-Qawuqji manned the ramparts of Arab history for four decades. In his most famous 
role he would command the Arab Liberation Army in the Arab-Israeli War of 1948. In this 
biography Laila Parsons tells al-Qawuqji’s story and sets it in the full context of his turbulent 
times. Following Israel’s decisive victory, al-Qawuqji was widely faulted as a poor leader with 
possibly dubious motives. Th e Commander shows us that the truth was more complex: although 
he doubtless made some strategic mistakes, he never gave up fi ghting for Arab independence 
and unity, even as those ideals were undermined by powers inside and outside the Arab world. 
In al-Qawuqji’s life story we fi nd the origins of today’s turmoil in the Arab Middle East.
February 2017, Saqi Books, £20.00
The Commander:
Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight for Arab 
Independence 1914-1948
By Laila Parsons
Th e Fatimid empire in North Africa, Egypt and Syria was at the centre of the political 
and religious history of the Islamic world in the Middle Ages, from the breakdown of 
the Abbasid empire in the 10th century, to the invasions of the Seljuqs in the 11th and the 
Crusaders in the 12th, leading up to its extinction by Saladin. As Imam and Caliph, the 
Fatimid sovereign claimed to inherit the religious and political authority of the Prophet, a 
claim which inspired the conquest of North Africa and Egypt and a following of believers 
as far away as India. Th e reaction this provoked was crucial to the political and religious 
evolution of mediaeval Islam. Th is book combines the separate histories of Isma’ilism, 
North Africa and Egypt with that of the dynasty into a coherent account. It then relates 
this account to the wider history of Islam to provide a narrative that establishes the 
historical signifi cance of the empire.
February 2017, Edinburgh University Press, £29.99
The Fatimid Empire
By Michael Brett
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Events in London
LISTINGS
THE EVENTS and organisations listed below are not necessarily 
endorsed or supported by 
The Middle East in London. 
The accompanying texts and 
images are based primarily 
on information provided by 
the organisers and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the 
compilers or publishers. While 
every possible effort is made to 
ascertain the accuracy of these 
listings, readers are advised to 
seek confirmation of all events 
using the contact details provided 
for each event. 
Submitting entries and updates: 
please send all updates and 
submissions for entries related 
to future events via e-mail to 
mepub@soas.ac.uk
BM – British Museum, Great 
Russell Street, London WC1B 
3DG 
SOAS –SOAS, University of 
London, Th ornhaugh Street, 
Russell Square, London WC1H 
0XG
LSE – London School of 
Economics and Political Science, 
Houghton Street, London WC2 
2AE
APRIL EVENTS
Saturday 1 April
10:15 am | Th e Danger of Words 
in an Age of Danger (Symposium) 
Organised by: Exiled Writers 
Ink and the Centre for Cultural, 
Literary and Postcolonial Studies, 
SOAS (CCLPS). Symposium 
setting out to examine the 
contemporary danger of words 
as it aff ects exiled writers. It will 
interrogate diverse aspects of the 
'Danger of Words' from denying 
exiled writers the freedom to 
write about the ills in their 
societies, to the manipulation of 
words, as it aff ects exiled writers. 
Tickets: £12/£8 EWI members/
asylum seekers and students free. 
Khalili Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. 
E jennifer@exiledwriters.fsnet.
co.uk W www.exiledwriters.co.uk 
/ www.soas.ac.uk/cclps/
1:15 pm | Light and Islamic 
Art (Gallery Talk) Hilary Lewis 
Ruttley (Independent Speaker). 
Organised by: BM. Admission 
free. Room 34, BM. T 020 7323 
8181 W www.britishmuseum.org
Wednesday 5 April
Time TBC | Syria: Six Years 
On- From Destruction to 
Reconstruction (Two-Day 
Conference: Wednesday 5 – 
Th ursday 6 April) Organised 
by: European Centre for the 
Study of Extremism (EuroCSE). 
Conference seeking to kick 
start the creation of eff ective 
dialogue, by promoting national 
reconciliation across Syria. 
Tickets: Various. Pre-registration 
required. Venue TBC. E 
syriaconferenceuk@gmail.com W 
www.eurocse.org
1:15 pm | Unwrapping Islamic 
Art (Gallery Talk) John Reeve 
(Independent Speaker). 
Organised by: BM. Admission 
free. Room 34, BM. T 020 7323 
8181 W www.britishmuseum.org
5:30 pm | Vestiges of Dissolved 
Libraries: Tracing Damascene 
Manuscripts (Lecture) Konrad 
Hirschler (Freie Universität 
Berlin). Organised by: Al-Furqan 
Islamic Heritage Foundation. 
Hirschler discusses the rich 
manuscript and library culture 
of Damascus up to the twentieth 
century in order to suggest 
possible approaches for future 
provenance research. Admission 
free. Pre-registration required. 
Al-Furqan headquarters offi  ce in 
London, 22A Old Court Place, 
Mohamed Abdalla Otaybi, Sudan: Emergence of Singularities (see 
Exhibitions p. 34)
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London W8 4PL. E info@al-
furqan.com W www.al-furqan.
com
Th ursday 6 April
Time TBC | Syria: Six Years 
On- From Destruction to 
Reconstruction (Two-Day 
Conference: Wednesday 5 – 
Th ursday 6 April) Organised by: 
European Centre for the Study 
of Extremism (EuroCSE). See 
above event listing for more 
information.
4:00 pm | Th e Visible Dead: 
Dolmen Tombs and the 
Landscape in Bronze Age Levant 
(Lecture) James Fraser (BM). 
Organised by: Th e Palestine 
Exploration Fund (PEF). 
Admission free. Pre-registration 
required. T 020 7323 8181 W 
www.britishmuseum.org BP 
Lecture Th eatre, Clore Education 
Centre, BM. T 020 7935 5379 E 
execsec@pef.org.uk W www.pef.
org.uk
7:00 pm | Iranian Music Refi ned 
and Recharged (Concert) 
Organised by: Department of 
Music, School of Arts, SOAS. 
Sponsored by: Iran Heritage 
Foundation (IHF), with additional 
support from Mrs Soudavar 
and the Nava Arts UK Centre. 
Saeid Kordmafi  on santour is 
joined by vocalist Mehdi Emami 
and Fariborz Kiannejad on 
tombak, showcasing the intricate 
characteristics of vocal and 
instrumental genres in classical 
Iranian music, preserved during 
time through aural traditions. 
Admission free. Pre-registration 
required. Brunei Gallery Lecture 
Th eatre, SOAS. T 020 7898 4500 
E musicevents@soas.ac.uk W 
www.soas.ac.uk/music/events/
concerts/
7:30 pm | Battersea Power 
Comedy (Performance) Comedy 
with Jenan Younis, a London 
based comedian of Iraqi and 
Palestinian descent. Admission 
free. Th e Grove, 279 Battersea 
Park Road, London SW11 4NE. E 
jenanyounis@gmail.com
Monday 10 April
7:00 pm | Screening: Letters from 
Baghdad + Q&A (Documentary) 
Organised by: Frontline Club.Th e 
story of the British spy, explorer 
and political powerhouse 
Gertrude Bell — sometimes 
called the “female Lawrence of 
Arabia”. Letters from Baghdad 
chronicles her extraordinary 
journey into both the uncharted 
Arabian desert and the inner 
sanctum of British colonial power. 
Followed by Q&A with directors 
Sabine Krayenbühl and Zeva 
Oelbaum. Tickets: £10/£8 conc. 
Frontline Club, 13 Norfolk Place, 
London W2 1QJ. T 020 7479 8940 
E events@frontlineclub.com W 
www.frontlineclub.com
Tuesday 11 April
1:15 pm | Silk Road Traders: the 
Sasanians (Gallery Talk) Diana 
Driscoll (Independent Speaker). 
Organised by: BM. Admission 
free. Room 52, BM. T 020 7323 
8181 W www.britishmuseum.org
6:00 pm | Mental Health System 
Reform in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory (Lecture) 
Hanna Kienzler. Organised by: 
Persian Calligraphy, Nasta'liq Script Course 
with Keramat Fathinia
Th is ten-week exercise based course on the w iting technique  of the Nasta'liq script 
is suitable for all levels, from beginners to advanced.  
You will also learn about the theory and history of Islamic calligraphy.
Every Monday 6:30-8:30pm at the London Middle East Institute from 24 April – 19 June 2017.
Fees: £250 (10% discount for early-bird registration by Monday 17 April 2017: £225). 
To register visit www.soas.ac.uk/lmei/events/. 
 
For more information T 020 7898 4330/4490 E vp6@soas.ac.uk
Organised by: London Middle East Institute, SOAS (LMEI)
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Council for British Research in 
the Levant (CBRL). Kienzler will 
present a case study that examines 
how mental health system reform 
processes in the West Bank are 
shaped by particular political 
events and power inequalities and 
investigates the ways in which 
local and international mental 
health providers relate to these 
processes. Admission free. British 
Academy, 10 Carlton House 
Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. 
T 020 7969 5296 E cbrl@britac.
ac.uk W www.cbrl.org.uk
Th ursday 13 April
1:15 pm | Th e Myth of Osiris in 
Ancient Egypt (Gallery Talk) 
George Hart (Independent 
Speaker). Organised by: BM. 
Admission free. Room 4, BM. 
T 020 7323 8181 W www.
britishmuseum.org
Saturday 15 April
2:00 pm | Artists’ Film Club: 
Basim Magdy + Q&A (Film) 
Organised by: Institute of 
Contemporary Arts (ICA). 
Egyptian artist Basim Magdy's 
work refl ects upon how we 
deal with the present social and 
economic climate in a pragmatic 
and humanistic way and provides 
an innovative narration of 
his own personal experiences 
and frank observations while 
evaluating the political histories 
of his nation. Tickets: £5. Cinema 
1, ICA, 12 Carlton House Terrace, 
London SW1Y 5AH. T 020 7930 
3647 E info@ica.org.uk W www.
ica.org.uk
Sunday 16 April
11:00 am | Digital Workshop: 
Egyptian Photo Booth Organised 
by: BM. Become an Egyptian 
pharaoh, god or dancer on a 
wall painting. Admission free. 
Samsung Centre, BM. T 020 7323 
8181 W www.britishmuseum.org
Tuesday 18 April
6:00 pm | Was Aleppo a 
Levantine City? (Lecture) Philip 
Mansel (Institute of Historical 
Research). Organised by: 
Council for British Research in 
the Levant (CBRL). Lecture to 
commemorate the life and work 
of archaeologist Crystal Bennett. 
From the sixteenth century aft er 
its conquest by the Ottoman 
Empire through to the French 
Mandate of the early twentieth 
century, Aleppo has been the 
residence of foreign consuls, 
and a centre of scholarship and 
modernisation. Tracing several 
centuries of history, Mansel asks: 
can we consider Aleppo to be a 
Levantine City? Admission free. 
British Academy, 10 Carlton 
House Terrace, London SW1Y 
5AH. T 020 7969 5296 E cbrl@
britac.ac.uk W www.cbrl.org.uk
7:00pm | Whatever did the 
Iranians do for Georgia? – 
Coexistence and Confl ict 
(Lecture) Donald Rayfi eld 
(Queen Mary University of 
London). Organised by: Th e Iran 
Society. Doors open 6:30pm. 
Georgians made many important 
contributions to Iran, particularly 
under Shah Abbas I, as military 
men, provincial governors and 
builders. Did Iran contribute 
nothing to Georgia other than 
ruin and destruction? Admission 
free for Society Members plus 
one guest. Pall Mall Room, Th e 
POWER STRUGGLES IN 
THE MIDDLE EAST
The Islamist Politics of Hizbullah 
and the Muslim Brotherhood
Eva Dingel
‘An innovative, well-argued and thoroughly 
researched addition to the debates surrounding 
the development of political Islam’
– Rachid Ouaissa, Philipps-Universitaet Marburg
Hardback
Available Now
320 pgs | 216 x 138 mm
£25.00 | 9781784534332
www.ibtauris.com
Who are the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizbullah? What do the two 
movements - one Sunni and one Shi’a - have in common? Despite 
FIMRKGPEWWM½IHF]ERYQFIVSJGSYRXVMIWEW³XIVVSVMWX´SVKERMWEXMSRW
FSXLEVIMRJEGXWIVMSYWTSPMXMGEPTPE]IVWMRXLIWXEXIWMR[LMGL
XLI]STIVEXI)K]TXERH0IFERSR&SXLLEZIEXZEVMSYWTSMRXW
EHZSGEXIHTER-WPEQMWQXLIYRMX]SJ1YWPMQWYRHIVER-WPEQMG
WXEXISVGEPMTLEXIFYXVEXLIVXLERGSRWMHIVMRKXLIQEWI\XVIQMWX
VIPMKMSYWQSZIQIRXW)ZE(MRKIPLIVIWXYHMIWXLIQEWTPE]IVW[MXLMR
XLITSPMXMGEPTVSGIWW7LIGSRWMHIVW[L]EXGIVXEMRTSMRXWXLI]LEZI
GLSWIRXSTPE]F]XLIGSRZIRXMSREPTSPMXMGEPVYPIW[LMPIHYVMRK
SXLIVTIVMSHWXLI]LEZIETTPMIHHMJJIVIRXQSVII\XVIQIQIXLSHW
SJTSPMXMGEPTVSXIWX(MRKIP W´GSQTEVEXMZILMWXSV]SJX[SSJXLIQSWX
TVSQMRIRXTSPMXMGEP-WPEQMWXQSZIQIRXWWLIHWPMKLXSRXLIGSQTPI\
ERHSJXIRQMWYRHIVWXSSHMRXIVEGXMSRFIX[IIR-WPEQERHTSPMXMGWMR
XLI1MHHPI)EWX
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Army & Navy Club, 36-39 Pall 
Mall, London SW1Y 5JN (Dress 
code calls for gentlemen to wear 
jacket and tie). T 020 7235 5122 
E info@iransociety.org W www.
iransociety.org / www.therag.
co.uk
Time TBC | G&B Comedy 
(Performance) Comedy with 
Jenan Younis. Tickets TBC. 
Downstairs at Th e Royal 
George, London WC2H 0EA. E 
jenanyounis@gmail.com
Wednesday 19 April
7:00 pm | Living with the 
Shahsevan: Before they became 
famous for their textiles 
(Lecture) Richard Tapper 
(SOAS). Organised by: Oriental 
Rug and Textile Society, UK 
(ORTS). Doors open 6:00pm. 
Tapper describes life among the 
Shahsevan nomads, giving some 
background to their history and 
details on the weaving that he 
observed, all illustrated with 
slides from the fi eld. Tickets: 
£7/£5 students. Membership of 
one year for 11 events at £20. 
Th e Church Hall Conference 
Room, St. James Church, 197 
Piccadilly, London  W1J 9LL. T 
020 7639 7593 E membership.
orts@gmail.com W www.
orientalrugandtextilesociety.org.
uk
Friday 21 April
9:30 am | Mapping Cultural 
Policy in the Arab Region 
(Conference) Organised by: 
Arab Media Centre and the 
Communication and Media 
Research Institute (CAMRI). 
Th e Arab Media Centre's twelft h 
international conference will 
look at the role of ‘culture’ and 
‘cultural policy’ in the Arab 
region within a context that takes 
into account the recent historical 
and political events that are 
reshaping the region’s societies, 
economies and culture industries. 
Tickets:  £85/£43 students. Pre-
registration required. University 
of Westminster, 309 Regent Street, 
London W1B 2HW. T 020 7911 
5000 E har-events@westminster.
ac.uk W  www.westminster.
ac.uk/arab-media-centre/events / 
https://camri.ac.uk/events/
Tuesday 25 April
4:30 pm | Mainstreaming Climate 
Change into GCC Economic 
Diversifi cation Plans (Seminar) 
Aisha Al-Sarihi (LSE). Organised 
by: LSE Kuwait Programme. 
Using specifi c examples, Al-
Sarihi will focus on the drivers 
of climate change action in the 
GCC, and potential factors and 
challenges to including climate 
change plans in economic 
diversifi cation strategies. Chair: 
Courtney Freer (LSE Kuwait 
Programme). Admission free. 
Pre-registration required. Room 
9.04, 9th fl oor, Tower 2, Clement’s 
Inn, LSE. T 020 7955 6639 E 
i.sinclair@lse.ac.uk W www.lse.
ac.uk/middleEastCentre/kuwait/
home.aspx
5:45 pm | Hadhramaut and 
its Diaspora: Yemeni Politics, 
Identity and Migration (Panel 
Discussion) Muhammad Bin-
Dohry, Noel Brehony, William 
Clarence-Smith, Th anos Petouris, 
Helen Lackner, and James 
Spencer. Organised by: London 
Middle East Institute, SOAS 
(LMEI) and the Hadhramaut 
Research Centre (HRC). Event 
to mark the launch of the 
Hadhramaut Research Centre's 
fi rst academic book Hadhramaut 
and its Diaspora: Yemeni Politics, 
Identity and Migration (Edited by 
Noel Brehony) which examines 
the Hadhrami diaspora, who 
travelled as religious scholars, 
traders, labourers and soldiers, 
to understand their enduring 
infl uence and the Hadhrami 
identity. Chair: William Clarence-
Smith (SOAS). Part of the 
LMEI's Tuesday Evening Lecture 
Programme on the Contemporary 
Middle East. Admission free. 
Wolfson Lecture Th eatre, Paul 
Webley Wing (Senate House), 
SOAS. T 020 7898 4330/4490 E 
vp6@soas.ac.uk W www.soas.
ac.uk/lmei/events/
Wednesday 26 April
6:00 pm | Th e PEF and its 
Photographs of Jerusalem 
(Lecture) David Jacobson (UCL). 
Organised by: Anglo Israel 
Archaeological Society (AIAS) 
and the Institute of Archaeology, 
UCL. Admission free. Lecture 
Th eatre G6, Isntitute of 
Archaeology, UCL, 31-34 Gordon 
Square, London WC1H OPY. T 
020 8349 5754 E sheilarford1@
sky.com W www.aias.org.uk
7:00 pm | From Literature to 
Palaeography. Two Centuries of 
Research on Islamic Calligraphy 
(Lecture) Nourane ben Azzouna 
(University of Strasbourg).
Organised by: Islamic Art Circle 
at SOAS. Chair: Scott Redford 
(SOAS). Admission free. Khalili 
Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. T 
07714087480 E rosalindhaddon@
gmail.com W www.soas.ac.uk/
art/islac/
Th ursday 27 April
5:45 pm | Making a Mark: A 
History of the Middle East 
through Postage Stamps 
(Lecture) Matthew Corbin Bishop 
(Artist, Historian and Author). 
Organised by: MBI Al Jaber 
Foundation. Part of the MBI Al 
Jaber Foundation Lecture Series. 
Admission free. Pre-registration 
Nadim Karam, Baby Phoenician on a Camel, Hannibal on an Elephant, Pomegranate Carrier on a Wild Cat (2017), Polished Stainless Steel and Corten 
Steel. Courtesy of the artist and the Fine Art Society. Nadim Karam: Urban Stories (see Exhibitions p. 34)
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CENTRE FOR IRANIAN 
STUDIES – SCHOLARSHIPS
SOAS, University of London, is pleased 
to announce the availability of several 
scholarships in its Centre for Iranian 
Studies (CIS). 
The Centre, established in 2010, draws 
upon the range of academic research and 
teaching across the disciplines of SOAS, 
including Languages and Literature, the 
Study of Religions, History, Economics, 
Politics, International Relations, Music, Art 
and Media and Film Studies. It aims to 
build close relations with likeminded 
institutions and to showcase and foster 
the best of contemporary Iranian talent in 
art and culture. 
MA in Iranian Studies
*OCISNFNCFSTTVDDFTTGVMMZ
launcIFEBOinterdisciplinary MA in 
Iranian Studies, UIFGJSTUPGJUTLJOEwhich 
will be off ered BHBJOJO
Thanks to the generosity of the Fereydoun 
Djam Charitable Trust, a number of Kamran 
Djam scholarships are available for BA, MA 
and MPhil/PhD studies.
For further details, please contact:
Scholarships Offi  cer 
E: scholarships@soas.ac.uk
T: +44 (0)20 7074 5091/ 5094
W: www.soas.ac.uk/scholarships
Centre for Iranian Studies
Dr Arshin Adib-Moghaddam (Chair) 
E: aa106@soas.ac.uk 
T: +44 (0)20 7898 4747 
W: www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis
MA in Iranian Studies
Dr Nima Mina (Department of the 
Languages and Culture of the Middle East) 
E: nm46@soas.ac.uk 
T: +44 (0)20 7898 4315 
W: www.soas.ac.uk/nme/programmes/
ma-in-iranian-studies
Student Recruitment
T: +44(0)20 7898 4034
E:  study@soas.ac.uk
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required. MBI Al Jaber Seminar 
Room, London Middle East 
Institute, SOAS, MBI Al Jaber 
Building, 21 Russell Square, 
London WC1B 5EA. E info@
mbifoundation.com W www.
mbifoundation.com
7:00 pm | Transnationalism in 
Iranian Political Th ought: Th e 
Life and Times of Ahmad Fardid 
(Book Launch/Documentary) 
Ali Mirsepassi (New York 
University). Organised by: Centre 
for Iranian Studies, SOAS. Event 
to mark the publication of Ali 
Mirsepassi’s Transnationalism 
in Iranian Political Th ought: 
Th e Life and Times of Ahmad 
Fardid (Cambridge University 
Press, 2017). By following the 
intellectual journey of the Iranian 
philosopher Ahmad Fardid, 
Mirsepassi off ers an account 
of the rise of political Islam in 
modern Iran. Th e documentary 
fi lm, Th e Fabulous Life and 
Th ought of Ahmad Fardid, is 
based on Mirsepassi’s book about 
Ahmad Fardid and is made by Ali 
Mirsepassi and Hamed Yousefi . 
Discussants: Arshin Adib-
Moghaddam (SOAS) and Hamed 
Yousefi . Admission free. Khalili 
Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. T 020 
7898 4330 E vp6@soas.ac.uk W 
www.soas.ac.uk/lmei-cis/events/
Saturday 29 April
Time TBC | Camel Cultures: 
Historical Traditions, Present 
Th reats, and Future Prospects 
(Two-Day Conference: Saturday 
29 - Sunday 30 April) Organised 
by: SOAS. Fourth international 
conference examining, 
documenting and celebrating 
camel cultures from around the 
world covering both Dromedaries 
and Bactrians. Tickets: TBC/
Free entry for SOAS staff , 
academics and students. Venue 
TBC. Pre-registration required. 
E ed.emery@soas.ac.uk W www.
soas.ac.uk
2:00 pm | Everything you always 
wanted to know about Ancient 
Mesopotamia (Lecture) Irving 
Finkel (BM). Organised by: BM. 
Finkel introduces the world of 
ancient Mesopotamia – the 'land 
between the two rivers' (the Tigris 
and the Euphrates), now part 
of modern Iraq. Tickets: £5/£3 
BM Members/conc. BP Lecture 
Th eatre, BM. T 020 7323 8181 E 
tickets@britishmuseum.org W 
www.britishmuseum.org
Sunday 30 April
Time TBC | Camel Cultures: 
Historical Traditions, Present 
Th reats, and Future Prospects 
(Two-Day Conference: Saturday 
29 - Sunday 30 April) Organised 
by: SOAS. See above event listing 
for more information.
EVENTS OUTSIDE 
LONDON
Saturday 1 April
7:30 pm | Th e Comedy Ladder 
(Performance) Comedy with 
Jenan Younis, a London based 
comedian of Iraqi and Palestinian 
descent. Tickets: £5. Th e Cross 
Keys East St, Th ame OX9 3JS. E 
jenanyounis@gmail.com
Saturday 8 April
TBC | Th e Comedy Ladder 
(Performance) Comedy with 
Jenan Younis. Admission free. 
Th e Comedy Ladder, Backstreet 
Coff ee Shop, Lower Church Street, 
Stokenchurch, High Wycombe 
HP14 3TH. E jenanyounis@
gmail.com
Tuesday 11 April 
Time TBC | Th ird Biennial 
Conference on Iranian Studies 
(Two-Day Conference: Tuesday 
11 – Wednesday 12 April) 
Organised by: Symposia Iranica. 
Conference covering all aspects 
of Iranian studies from prehistory 
to the present within the art, 
humanities and social sciences. 
Tickets: £50. Pre-registration 
required. Pembroke College, 
University of Cambridge, 
Cambridge CB2 1RF. E offi  ce@
symposia-iranica.com W http://
symposia-iranica.com/
Wednesday 12 April
Time TBC | Th ird Biennial 
Conference on Iranian Studies 
(Two-Day Conference: Tuesday 
11 – Wednesday 12 April) 
Organised by: Symposia Iranica. 
See above event listing for more 
information.
Friday 14 April
7:30 pm | Funny Girls 
(Performance) Comedy with 
Jenan Younis. Tickets: £5. Th e 
Caroline of Brunswick, Ditchling 
Road, Brighton BN1 4SB. E 
jenanyounis@gmail.com
MAY EVENTS
Tuesday 2 May
5:45 pm | Th e Commander: 
Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the 
Fight for Arab Independence 
Mo Abbaro, Sudan: Emergence of Singularities (see Exhibitions p. 34)
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1914-1948 (Lecture) Laila 
Parsons (Institute of Islamic 
Studies, McGill University). 
Organised by: London Middle 
East Institute, SOAS (LMEI). 
Lecture by Parson's on her 
latest book Th e Commander: 
Fawzi al-Qawuqji and the Fight 
for Arab Independence 1914-
1948 (Hill and Wang, 2016). 
Revered by some as the Arab 
Garibaldi, maligned by others 
as an intriguer and opportunist, 
Parsons tells Qawuqji’s dramatic 
story and sets it in the full context 
of his turbulent times. Chair: 
Charles Tripp (SOAS). Part of the 
LMEI's Tuesday Evening Lecture 
Programme on the Contemporary 
Middle East. Admission free. 
Wolfson Lecture Th eatre, Paul 
Webley Wing (Senate House), 
SOAS. T 020 7898 4330/4490 E 
vp6@soas.ac.uk W www.soas.
ac.uk/lmei/events/
Saturday 6 May
10:00 am | BATAS 2017 Spring 
Symposium Organised by: British 
Association for Turkish Area 
Studies (BATAS) in association 
with the London Middle East 
Institute, SOAS (LMEI). Speakers 
include: Uluç Gürkan (Former 
Deputy Speaker of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly), Scott 
Redford (SOAS), Ezgi Başaran 
(Programme on Contemporary 
Turkey at SEESOX (South East 
European Studies at Oxford)), and 
Rachel Harris (SOAS). Th e Spring 
Symposium, one of BATAS’s two 
regular annual events, aims to 
bring together a diverse range of 
topics relating to Turkey and its 
cultural/geopolitical area; this 
year history, architecture, music, 
religion and current aff airs are 
all represented.Tickets: TBC. 
Wolfson Lecture Th eatre, Paul 
Webley Wing (Senate House), 
SOAS. T 01962 889014 E jill.
sindall143@gmail.com W http://
batas.org.uk/
8:45 am | Ibn Arabi and 
the Philosophers: Reason, 
Revelation and Inspiration 
(Symposium) Organised by: Th e 
Muhyiddin Ibn 'Arabi Society 
and the Department of the 
Languages and Cultures of Near 
and Middle East, SOAS.Annual 
symposium bringing together 
people from many diff erent 
fi elds and traditions, including 
scholars, students, and anyone 
interested in what Ibn 'Arabi has 
to say. Tickets: £50/£45 Society 
Members/£10 students. Brunei 
Gallery Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. 
E events.uk@ibnarabisociety W 
www.ibnarabisociety.org
Sunday 7 May
Time TBC | Arabs Are Not 
Funny (Performance) Comedy 
with Jenan Younis. Tickets TBC. 
Courtyard Th eatre, London N1 
6EU.  E jenanyounis@gmail.com
Monday 8 May
6:00 pm | Finding the Philistines: 
Ceramic Evidence of the 
Northern Sea Peoples at Tell 
Tayinat (Lecture) Brian Janeway 
(Tell Tayinat Archaeological 
Project). Organised by: Anglo 
Israel Archaeological Society 
(AIAS) and the Institute of 
Archaeology, UCL. Admission 
free. Lecture Th eatre G6, 
Institute of Archaeology, UCL, 
31-34 Gordon Square, London 
WC1H OPY. T 020 8349 5754 E 
sheilarford1@sky.com W www.
aias.org.uk
Tuesday 9 May
6:00 pm | Polis to Medina 
Revisited: urban change in the 
Levant between Antiquity and 
Islam (Lecture) Hugh Kennedy 
(SOAS). Organised by: Council 
for British Research in the Levant 
(CBRL). Admission free. British 
Academy, 10 Carlton House 
Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. 
T 020 7969 5296 E cbrl@britac.
ac.uk W www.cbrl.org.uk
Wednesday 10 May
7:00 pm | Reforming Culture: 
Art and Imitation in Tunisia 
(1830-1881) (Lecture) Ridha 
Moumni (Institut de Recherches 
sur le Maghreb Contemporain, 
Tunis). Organised by: Islamic 
Art Circle at SOAS. Chair: Scott 
Redford (SOAS). Admission free. 
Khalili Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. T 
07714087480 E rosalindhaddon@
gmail.com W www.soas.ac.uk/
art/islac/
Tuesday 16 May 
7:00 pm | Centenary Lecture: 
Dr Mohamed ElBaradei, Nobel 
Peace Prize winner Organised 
by: SOAS. Mohamed ElBaradei 
was Director General of the 
International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA) and is currently 
Director General Emeritus. In 
his lecture he will examine the 
inextricable link between human 
dignity and a sustainable world 
order and will focus on the 
increasing global inequity and 
insecurity that mar our world 
leading to a serious crises of 
global governance. Admission 
free. Pre-registration required. 
W www.eventbrite.co.uk Brunei 
Gallery Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. 
T 020 7898 4054 E centenary@
soas.ac.uk W www.soas.ac.uk/
centenary/centenary-events/
7:00pm | Yazd in the Early 
Modern Period (Lecture) Derek 
Mancini (SOAS). Organised 
by: Th e Iran Society. Doors 
open 6:30pm. Annual General 
Meeting at 6:15pm. Admission 
free for Society Members plus 
one guest. Pall Mall Room, Th e 
Army & Navy Club, 36-39 Pall 
Mall, London SW1Y 5JN (Dress 
code calls for gentlemen to wear 
jacket and tie). T 020 7235 5122 
E info@iransociety.org W www.
iransociety.org / www.therag.
co.uk
Th ursday 18 May
5:45 pm | Arabia on a Plate: 
Eating and Sailing on the 
Trade Routes from the Gulf to 
the Red Sea Ports and Beyond 
(Lecture) Sarah Al-Hamad 
(Author). Organised by: MBI 
Al Jaber Foundation. Lecture by 
Al-Hamad, author of Cardamom 
and Lime: Recipes from the 
Arabian Gulf. Part of the MBI Al 
Jaber Foundation Lecture Series. 
Admission free. Pre-registration 
Nadim Karam, Trou de Mémoire (2017) Courtesy of the artist and the Fine 
Art Society. Nadim Karam: Urban Stories (see Exhibitions p. 34)
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required. MBI Al Jaber Seminar 
Room, London Middle East 
Institute, SOAS, MBI Al Jaber 
Building, 21 Russell Square, 
London WC1B 5EA. E info@
mbifoundation.com W www.
mbifoundation.com
6:30 pm | Sacred Landscapes and 
Alalakh as Hittite Cult Center: 
Tell Atchana Excavations 
(Lecture) K Aslıhan Yener (Th e 
Oriental Institute, University 
of Chicago & Koç University). 
Organised by: British Institute 
at Ankara (BIAA). Oliver 
Gurney Memorial Lecture. Th is 
lecture will focus on the recent 
excavations at Tell Atchana, 
which provide fresh information 
about the site’s chronology and 
sacred architecture, and include 
the discovery of new seals and 
burial practices. Tickets: £10/
BIAA members free. British 
Academy, 10-11 Carlton House 
Terrace, London SW1Y 5AH. E 
biaa@britac.ac.uk W www.biaa.
ac.uk/events
Wednesday 24 May
Time TBC | Yahweh comes from 
the South Revisited (Lecture) 
Robert D. Miller (Catholic 
University of America). Organised 
by: Th e Palestine Exploration 
Fund (PEF) and King's College 
London. Admission free. CL Nash 
Lecture Th eatre, King’s Building, 
King's College London, Strand, 
London WC2R 2LS.  T 020 7935 
5379 E execsec@pef.org.uk W 
www.pef.org.uk
Th ursday 25 May
6:00 pm | Parsi Traders and 
Travellers: Global Zoroastrians 
in the Age of Empire (Lecture) 
Jesse Palsetia  (University of 
Guelph, Canada). Organised by: 
Department of Religions and 
Philosophies, SOAS in association 
with Th e World Zoroastrian 
Organisation. Twentieth Dastur 
Dr Sohrab Hormasji Kutar 
Memorial Lecture. Palsetia 
examines the spread of Parsi 
traders and travellers from the 
eighteenth to the nineteenth 
century. Admission free. Khalili 
Lecture Th eatre, SOAS. E ah69@
soas.ac.uk W www.soas.ac.uk/
rel igions-and-philosophies/
events/
EVENTS OUTSIDE 
LONDON
Monday 22 May
7:00 pm | Th e Quest for the 
Historical King David: New 
Light from Khirbet Qeiyafa and 
Khirbet El Rai (Lecture) Yosef 
Garfi nkel (Th e Hebrew University 
of Jerusalem). Organised by: 
Anglo Israel Archaeological 
Society (AIAS). Admission free. 
Manchester Jewish Museum, 190 
Cheetham Hill Road, Manchester 
M8 8LW. T 020 8349 5754 E 
sheilarford1@sky.com W www.
aias.org.uk
Friday 26 May 
7:00 pm | Comedy San Frontières 
(Performance) Comedy with 
Jenan Younis. Donations to 
Médecins Sans Frontières. 
Junkyard Dogs, Brighton BN2 
0JG. E jenanyounis@gmail.com
Saturday 27 May 
7:30 pm | Legends Comedy Club 
(Performance) Comedy with 
Jenan Younis. Tickets TBC. Th e 
Oakhouse, Essex CM9 5PF. E 
jenanyounis@gmail.com
EXHIBITIONS
Until 2 April | Iranian Voices: 
Recent Acquisitions of Works 
on Paper Made by Iranian 
artists of diff erent generations 
and including a variety of media 
from collage to artist books and 
photography the narratives of 
the works on display highlight 
an engagement with Iranian 
history from the legendary tales 
of the Shahnameh to insights into 
the politics of recent decades. 
Admission free. Room 34, 
BM. T 020 7323 8299 E info@
britishmuseum.org W www.
britishmuseum.org
Until 29 April | Th e Ocean Can 
Be Yours Exhibition showcasing 
Persian culture and its merged 
visual art and linguistic practice 
via the interpretation of 
international poetry through 
the lens of four Iranian artists. 
Afsoon, Ghalamdar, Jason 
Noushin and Katayoun Rouhi 
explore a tradition rooted in 
their shared heritage and use 
it as the launch platform for 
diverse practices spanning 
performance and Calligraffi  ti to 
drawing and allegorical painting. 
Admission free. Saturdays and 
by appointment Monday to 
Th ursday. Gerald Moore Gallery, 
Mottingham Lane, London SE9 
4RW. T 020 8857 0448 / 020 7830 
9327 E janet@janetradyfi neart.
com W www.geraldmooregallery.
org / www.janetradyfi neart.com
Until 19 May | A Tale of Two 
Rivers: Th e Lower Wye and the 
Nubian Nile Th e Nile in Sudan, 
the Wye in Wales/England – what 
do they have in common? Herman 
Bell presents images and artefacts 
that link the two rivers and refl ects 
on how the people of each river 
valley are dealing with threats to 
Kamala Ibrahim Ishaaq, Sudan: Emergence of Singularities (see Exhibitions p. 34)
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 Nadim Karam, Desert Sand, Chatsworth, UK. Courtesy of the artist and the Fine Art Society. Nadim Karam: Urban 
Stories (see Exhibitions p. 34)
their environment. Admission 
free. Institute of Arab and Islamic 
Studies ‘Th e Street’, University of 
Exeter, Stocker Road, Exeter EX4 
4ND. E m.j.williams2@exeter.
ac.uk / cas@soas.ac.uk W http://
socialsciences.exeter.ac.uk/iais/
events/exhibitions/
 
Until 29 April | Return to 
Kurdistan Exhibition of 
contemporary photographs of 
Iraqi Kurdistan and Northern 
Iraq by Gulan’s Creative Director 
Richard Wilding, alongside 
historical photographs taken in 
the 1940s by British photographer 
Anthony Kersting whose archive 
is held by Th e Courtauld Institute 
of Art’s Conway Library. Th e 
Courtauld Institute of Art, 
Somerset House, Strand, London 
WC2R 0RN. Admission free. E 
info@gulan.org.uk / kurdistan@
courtauld.ac.uk W www.gulan.
org.uk / http://courtauld.ac.uk/
Until 6 May | Sudan: Emergence 
of Singularities Interdisciplinary 
Sudanese contemporary art 
exhibition which  will include a 
series of fi lm screenings, talks 
and events exposing a mix of 
voices and new perspectives 
for understanding Sudanese 
society and cultures. Admission 
free. P21 Gallery, 21 Chalton 
Street, London NW1 1JD. T 
020 7121 6190 E info@p21.org.
uk W www.p21.gallery / www.
emergingsudan.com
Until 23 May | Egypt, Th e Eternal 
Inspiration Paintings by the artist 
Dina El-Sioufi  inspired by Ancient 
Egyptian murals and sculptures. 
Egyptian Bureau for Cultural & 
Education Aff airs, 4 Chesterfi eld 
Gardens, London W1J 5BG. T 
020 7491 7720 E administration@
egyculture.org.uk
Friday 7 April 
Until 17 June | Still UK based 
artist Judy Price presents a 
unique and complex body of 
work focused on Palestine. Two 
multi-screen installations and 
a photographic piece refl ect in 
very diff erent ways on Palestine’s 
colonial past and the current 
lived experience of occupation. 
Admission free. Th e Mosaic 
Rooms, A.M. Qattan Foundation, 
Tower House, 226 Cromwell 
Road, London SW5 0SW. T 020 
7370 9990 E info@mosaicrooms.
org W http://mosaicrooms.org/
Monday 24 April   
Until 19 May | Nadim Karam: 
Urban Stories Lebanese artist 
and architect Nadim Karam's fi rst 
major London exhibition, best 
known for his large-scale urban 
art projects which explore the use 
of public art as an instrument of 
storytelling and activism, Karam's 
work focuses on re-examining 
perceptions of pluralism and 
diff erence within societies as a 
source of enrichment rather than 
confl ict. Admission free. Th e Fine 
Art Society, 148 New Bond Street, 
London W1S 2JT. T 020 7629 
5116 E art@thefi neartsociety.com 
W www.thefi neartsociety.com
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For further details, please contact: 
 
Ŕ Develop an understanding  
of the complexities of modern and 
contemporary Palestine 
Ŕ Explore history, political structure, 
development,  
culture and society 
Ŕ Obtain a multi-disciplinary overview 
Ŕ Enrol on a flexible, inter-disciplinary 
study programme
NEW
MA PALESTINE   
STUDIES
Photograph © Iselin-Shaw
 www.soas.ac.uk
Dr Adam Hanieh
E: ah92@soas.ac.uk
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An intensive five-week programme which includes two courses: 
an Arabic Language Course (introductory or intermediate) and 
another on ‘Government and Politics of the Middle East.
FEES
Session (5 weeks) Programme fee* Accommodation fee**
24 June–26 July 2013 (two courses) £2,500 from £300/week
* Early bird discounts of 10% apply to course fees before 1 March 2013.
** Accommodation fees must be paid by 1 March 2013 to secure accommodation.
 Please check our website from mid-October 2012 for confi rmed prices.
For more information, please contact Louise Hosking on 
lh2@soas.ac.uk. Or check our website www.soas.ac.uk/lmei
Middle East 
Summer School
24 June – 26 July 20133 -24 July 2014
* An early bird discount of 10  applies to course fees before 15 April 2014.
** Rooms can be booked at the Intercollegiate Halls which are located in the heart of 
Bloomsbury: www.halls.london.ac.uk.
LH
y
19 June-20 July 2017
Beginners Arabic (Level 1)
Beginners Arabic (Level 2)
Th is course is a continuation of Beginners Arabic Level 1. It 
completes the coverage of the grammar and syntax of Modern 
Standard Arabic and trains students in reading, comprehending 
and writing with the help of a dictionary more complex Arabic 
sentences and passages.
Culture and Society in the Middle East  
Th is course examines the major cultural patterns and institutions 
of the MENA region. It is taught through a study of some lively 
topics such as religious and ethnic diversity, impact of the West, 
stereotyping, the role of tradition, education (traditional and 
modern), family structure and value, gender politics, media, life in 
city, town and village, labour and labour migration, the Palestinian 
refugee problem and Arab exile communities, culinary cultures, 
music and media, etc.
Th is course provides an introduction to the politics of the Middle 
East and North Africa (MENA) region. It gives on a country by 
country basis, an overview of the major political
issues and developments in the region since the end of the First 
World War and addresses key themes in the study of contemporary 
Middle East politics, including: the role of the military, social and 
economic development, political Islam, and the recent uprisings (the 
‘Arab Spring’).
Government and Politics of
the Middle East
19 -20 July 2017 (two courses)
An intensive five-week programme which includes a choice of two 
courses: a language one (Persian or Arabic, the latter at two levels) 
and another on the 'Government and Politics of the Middle East' or 
'Culture and Society in the Mi dle East'.
To qualify for entry into this course, students should have 
already completed at least one introductory course in 
Arabic.
Th is is an introductory course in Modern Standard Arabic. It 
teaches students the Arabic script and provides basic grounding in 
Arabic grammar and syntax. On completing the course, students 
should be able to read, write, listen to and understand simple Arabic 
sentences and passages. Th is course is for complete beginners and 
does not require any prior knowledge or study of Arabic.
Beginners Persian (Level 1)
Th is is an introductory course which aims to give the students a 
reasonable grounding in the basics of Persian grammar and syntax 
as well as to enable them to understand simple and frequently used 
expressions related to basic language use. Th ey will be able to hold 
uncomplicated conversations on topics such as personal and family 
information, shopping, hobbies, employment as well as simple and 
direct exchanges of information related to familiar topics. By the 
end of the course they will also progress to read simple short texts.
Timetable
Courses are taught Mon-Th u each week. Language courses are taught 
in the morning (10am-1pm) and the Politics and Culture Courses are 
taught in two slots in the aft ernoon 
(2:00-3:20 and 3:40-5:00pm).
7      
* An early bird discount of 10% applies to course fees before 30 April 2017. 
A discount of 15% applies to SOAS alumni and 20% to SOAS students.
(one course) £1,400
A limited number of partial tuition fee waivers of up to 50% off  the fee are available 
to SOAS’s current students on a fi rst come, fi rst serve basis (please enquire).
